Tuesday, February 09, 2021

District court erred by: (1) failing to inquire into reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel; (2) failing to make independent determination regarding consulation between defendant and appointed counsel about PSR; (3) imposing certain conditions of supervised release; and imposing special assessment under JVTA

 Defendant Charles Senke was convicted after trial for attempted sex offenses involving a minor. He raised four objections on appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions, but vacated and remanded for further proceedings surrounding sentencing. United States v. Senke, __ F.3d __, 2021 WL 244056 (3d Cir. Jan. 25, 2021).

(1) Although Senke did not specifically request substitute counsel in his pro se pretrial motion complaining about his attorney, the district court was required to inquire into reasons for defendant's dissatisfaction with his appointed attorney. Senke's communication to district court raised serious issues, including that attorney was not preparing for trial or reviewing evidence with defendant, attorney brought strained relationship to district court's attention at pretrial conference that defendant did not attend, explaining that conflict stemmed from his refusal to file additional pretrial motions and defendant's insistence that he do so, and district court had no good reason to believe that communication issues were resolved. However, Senke's claim did not constitute one of structural error requiring per se reversal. He could not assert he was deprived of counsel of choice because he had appointed counsel. He also was not claiming that he had been deprived of his right to represent himself. Instead, he claimed he was deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel. Acting in accordance with its general procedure, the Third Circuit declined to entertain Senke's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal where Senke did not attempt to show prejudice and district court had not yet evaluated the matter. Instead, it upheld Senke's conviction without prejudice to his ability to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. 

(2) District court plainly erred in failing to independently determine that defendant had opportunity to discuss presentence investigation report (PSR) with counsel as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A). Though counsel submitted sentencing memorandum and defendant separately submitted objections to PSR, indicating that both had read the PSR, the district court did not verbally ask defendant if he read and discussed PSR with his attorneys, sentencing memorandum did not state that defendant and counsel discussed the PSR, counsel submitted his objection to probation officer before receiving defendant's objections, and counsel only mentioned his own objection at sentencing and not defendant's objections. Despite the error, Senke suffered no prejudice as would warrant reversal of sentence. Though Senke asserted that, if he had discussed the PSR with counsel, he could have challenged the recommendation of certain special conditions of supervised release and recommendation of special assessment fee, neither of those matters could have affected Senke's criminal history category, nor his applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and Senke was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum.

 (3) The Third Circuit vacated 5 separate conditions of supervised release prohibiting Senke from possessing or using computers or other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, and requiring him to obtain permission from his probation officer to use the internet, to have monitoring software installed on his computer, and to submit to searches of his electronic devices. The Court found the conditions were not sufficiently tailored to goal of restricting internet and computer use to keep Senke from preying on children. Instead, the restrictions prohibited Senke from participating in all sorts of activities, while doing nothing to further public safety. In a dissenting opinion, Judge McKee admonished district court judges to stop imposing "knee-jerk and overly broad restrictions" on computer and internet usage despite repeated admonitions against them. 

(4) Finally, the Third Circuit reversed imposition of a $10,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (JVTA) based on a violation of the ex post facto clause. All of Senke's convictions were based on offenses committed prior to JVTA's 2015 enactment.

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The District Court's indication of the sentence it would impose before the defendant allocuted was not reversible plain error.

              In United States v. Packer , 83 F.4th 193 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2023), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/222554p.pdf , the ...