In United States v. Donte Dowdell, Appeal No. 21-3251, the Government appealed the District Court's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. In the District Court, the government argued that the law enforcement officer who stopped Dowdell had reasonable suspicion to believe crime was afoot, which justified the officer opening Dowdell's car door. After opening the door, the officer saw in bulge in Dowdell's jacket at chest-level. He immediately ordered Dowdell out of the car and patted him down, revealing a fully loaded semi-automatic firearm with a bullet in the chamber. The District Court granted Dowdell's suppression motion after finding that the government failed to establish reasonable suspicion.
After ruling that the evidence would be suppressed because the government failed to establish that the officer opened the door without violating Dowdell’s Fourth Amendment rights, the District Court suggested that the government might have made an alternative argument that Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), could be extended to permit officers to order people out of a car during a valid traffic stop without requiring reasonable suspicion to do so. Because the government failed to raise this alternative argument, however, the District Court found it had been waived and refused to rule on the issue.
On appeal, the Third Circuit acknowledged that it had not yet decided whether police officers may open car doors during routine traffic stops based on less than reasonable suspicion without violating the Fourth Amendment. The District Court suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson might be extended to cover those circumstances. But the government never raised or litigated that argument in the District Court. So the argument was forfeited. And the
argument the government did make—that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe crime was afoot that justified his opening the car door—was invalid. The Court further held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it did not excuse the government’s forfeiture. For these reasons, the Court found the rule of law required it to affirm the order of the District Court.
Circuit Judge Fisher, in a dissenting opinion, would have vacated the District Court's order and remanded for further proceedings. Judge Fisher argued that the District Court's waiver determination was based on an incorrect application of the law. Nor was it clear to Judge Fisher that the government failed to preserve a Wilson-extension argument below. Even if the government had failed to properly preserve the Wilson-extension argument, Judge Fisher would have reversed the District Court's suppression order because "courts are obligated to apply the legal principles they identify as correct, and the District Court correctly recognized that officers do not require reasonable suspicion to open a car door when conducting a traffic stop."
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