Sunday, July 09, 2017
Jurisdiction for revocation of supervised release where revocation also imposed in other District on concurrent case and local Probation Office was not supervising releasee
In United States v. Johnson, 2017 WL 2819210 (June 30, 2017), http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163268p.pdf, the Third Circuit rejected two jurisdictional challenges to a revocation proceeding in one District where the defendant was also concurrently supervised and revoked in another District. For separate federal offenses in the Middle District of Florida and Virgin Islands, Johnson was serving two concurrent terms of supervised release. He was living in and supervised by the Middle District of Florida and had no contact with the Probation Office in the Virgin Islands. He committed a new offense in Florida and the Middle District revoked his supervised release. Johnson challenged revocation proceedings in the Virgin Islands. The Third Circuit found that the Virgin Islands maintained jurisdiction. It joined the Second and Fifth Circuits in finding that concurrent terms of supervised release do not merge: the term of supervised release in the Virgin Islands was not constructively discharged by revocation in Florida and Florida would not have jurisdiction to discharge the Virgin Islands supervised release absent formal transfer of supervision under 18 U.S.C. § 3605. The Third Circuit also found that the inaction of the Probation Office in the Virgin Islands in supervising Johnson in Florida did not cut short the District Court’s jurisdiction over revocation of supervised release.
Saturday, July 08, 2017
Remand for evidentiary hearing on trial counsel's ineffectiveness regarding co-defendant's statements to a psychiatrist being used for their truth against defendant
In Lambert v. Warden, 2017 WL 2784960 (June 28, 2017), http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161209p.pdf, the Third Circuit held that an error by a habeas petitioner’s post-conviction counsel excused the procedural default of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective, see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. This case proceeded through trial in Pennsylvania, direct appeal, habeas petition in Pennsylvania (PCR), habeas petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and was before the Third Circuit on a certificate of appealability. Thus, federal review of state court determinations was examined under AEDPA’s “deferential standard of review.”
The Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on not asking for a limiting instruction to protect Lambert’s Confrontation Clause rights. Lambert’s co-defendant had introduced a psychiatric expert to explain he had voices in his head at the time of the murders and so did not have the required specific intent. While a statement that Lambert handed the co-defendant a gun was redacted, there was no limiting instructions that the co-defendant’s statements could not be used against Lambert. In closing, the prosecutor argued that those out-of-court statements helped prove Lambert’s guilt. Ineffective assistance of counsel could not be raised until PCR and PCR attorneys filed no-merit letters explaining the statements were party admissions. The Third Circuit held that the co-defendant's statements to the psychiatrist were testimonial. Lambert need not prove the primary purpose of recording the co-defendant's statements was to accuse him of a crime. In the context of a joint trial, it is enough to show the co-defendant's statements were made for the primary purpose of substituting for his in-court testimony about the crime. The Circuit also held (1) the trial-ineffectiveness claim had some merit, reasonable jurists could find that the prosecutor’s closing arguments relied on the truth of the co-defendant’s statement to a psychiatric expert to draw conclusions about the defendant’s intent in his co-defendant’s plan; and (2) PCR counsel was ineffective for not raising it, thus excusing under Martinez the default of not raising an ineffectiveness of counsel claim.However, the double layer of deference under AEDPA and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. (1979) (light most favorable to government) led the Court to deny Lambert’s sufficiency claim. The Third Circuit could not conclude that it was “objectively unreasonable” for the Pennsylvania Superior Court to decide Lambert was guilty of the crimes.
Court of Appeals joins eight other Circuit Courts in finding legal innocence to be a valid basis for motion to withdraw guilty plea. But in doing so, affirms denial of motion because there was no credible evidence presented of innocence. Assertions alone are insufficient.
In United States v. James, No. 18-2569 (June 27, 2019), the Court of Appeals, through an opinion by Judge Jordan, affirmed the denial of de...
Excludable time for competency determination under STA does not automatically include delay for transportation beyond ten days; delay in transport found unreasonable and therefore not excludable.On January 28, 2014, Williams was charged by information with federal and VI firearms offenses. Prior to arraignment, Williams's counse...
Failure to postpone sentencing contravened the principles underlying the right to allocution, codified in Fed.R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)In United States v. Chapman, Appeal No. 17-1656 (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/171656p.pdf , the Third Circuit vac...