United States v. Walker, 2021 WL 833994 (Mar. 5, 2021) (Jordan, Krause, Roth),
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/154062p.pdf
In Walker, the Third Circuit ruled that
both Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery are 924(c) predicates. Although Walker
itself involved only a question of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the issue of
substantive Hobbs Act robbery remained undecided after an earlier decision in United States v. Copes was issued
unpublished. The Court rejected Walker’s
argument that Hobbs Act robbery cannot
be a crime of violence because it can be completed by taking money from a
victim “through fear of injury to the victim's intangible property” without the
use or threatened use of force. Looking
to the history of the statute, the Court found that a physical act is a key
component of the offense, and that “a non-forcible taking based on fear of
injury to intangible property would not be sufficient to satisfy the force
requirement of Hobbs Act robbery, since Hobbs Act robbery is simply a common
law robbery that affects interstate commerce.”
Next, the
Court looked to the elements of attempt: 1. an act with the intent to violate
the statute, and 2. an act believed to be a substantial step in the commission
of the crime; and found those elements aligned with the force element of a
924(c) crime of violence, “an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force.” Essentially the
Court held that an attempted attempt at use of force, is an “attempted use” of
force. While agreeing that “an intent to
act” is not the same as an “attempt to act,” the Court found that the Congressional
intent behind the statute “meant for all attempted crimes of violence to be
captured by the elements clause of § 924(c), and courts are not free to
disregard that direction and hold otherwise.’
Note: There
remains a circuit split on whether attempted HAR is a 924(c) predicate. See United
States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2020).
Additionally,
the Court held that cell site location information (CSLI) evidence obtained
without warrant came within the “good faith” exception to exclusionary rule, where
government agents obtained the evidence in reliance on then-valid judicial
order, which was issued in accordance with then-valid statute and then-binding
appellate authority, prior to Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), which held that compliance with
the Stored Communications Act alone is not sufficient to legally access
historical cell-site records because the showing required by the government does
not meet the probable cause standard required for a warrant.
Finally, the
Court held that the testimony of an investigator regarding the CSLI did not
violate the Confrontation Clause because 1. the witness was arguably discussing
his own work, and 2. any error was not plain where there was no consensus
concerning the bounds of the Confrontation Clause when multiple people
collaborate to make a testimonial statement.
Blog post written by: Christy Martin
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