In United States v. Raul Rodriguez, Nos. 18-1606 and 18-1664 (3d Cir., May 1, 2019), Defendant pled
guilty one count each of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and
924(c). The district court ruled that the robbery was a crime of violence under
§ 924(c), but it was not a crime of violence under the career-offender
guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision. Citing United States v.
Robinson, 844 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2016), the court reiterated that, when a firearm is brandished during a Hobbs Act robbery, the robbery constitutes a
crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
However, the court ruled that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence
under the career-offender guideline. The Third Circuit initially concluded that
Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements
clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1) because the statutory definition of the offense did not
contain the requisite elements. The Third Circuit further determined that Hobbs
Act robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the enumerated-offense
clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) because its statutory definition was broader than the
two most closely-related enumerated offenses, namely robbery and extortion.
Specifically, the court determined that the statutory definition of Hobbs Act
robbery was broader than generic robbery and extortion as narrowly defined in
the guidelines because the latter prohibit crimes involving force against
persons, while Hobbs Act robbery prohibited crimes involving force against
persons or property.
Note that this decision is unpublished, but its reasoning is
persuasive and the briefing in the case may be consulted when litigating this
issue before future panels of the Court of Appeals.
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