Court Upholds Constitutionality of "SORNA"

In United States v. Shenandoah, No. 09-1205 (Feb. 9, 2010), the Third Circuit confronted one of what it called “hundreds of similar challenges” filed in federal courts to the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). In one fell swoop, it rejected a broad range of constitutional challenges in the case of a defendant convicted of statutory rape a decade before the law’s enactment in 2006.

Upon being paroled, Paul Shenandoah registered as a sex offender under the law of New York State, where he had been convicted. In August of 2007, he moved to Pennsylvania for employment as an iron worker. He did not register in that state as a sex offender or modify his New York registration to reflect his change of residence and employment. SORNA, as construed by the Court, requires persons in his position to keep their registration current on and after July 27, 2006. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the district court’s rejection of his motion to dismiss on various grounds. He was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, to be followed by ten years of supervised release.

As a threshold matter, the Third Circuit found it immaterial that neither Pennsylvania nor New York had complied with SORNA’s statutory mandates regarding, for instance, provision of registration information to certain entities. The Court found it sufficient simply that Pennsylvania and New York each operated sex offender registries after SORNA’s effective date. In a related conclusion, the Court held that the defendant could have complied with SORNA by following the two states’ laws, and thus rejected a due process challenge premised on the contention that compliance was impossible.

The Court next rejected an ex post facto challenge grounded on the fact that the defendant’s release from prison and original registration obligation predated SORNA’s enactment. There was no retroactive application of any law inflicting greater punishment for preexisting conduct, the Court concluded. Rather, the defendant committed a new crime by moving from Pennsylvania to New York roughly 13 months after SORNA’s enactment and then failing to keep his registration in the two states current. The Court did not pause to mention a challenge pending before the Supreme Court, Carr v. United States, No. 08-1301 (Carr’s merits brief here; brief of the United States here), concerning the Ex Post Facto Clause’s application to a registered offender whose travel in interstate commerce predated SORNA’s enactment. Oral argument is to be heard in that case next week.

Turning to a challenge under the Due Process Clause, the Court found that the conviction was not infirm for lack of notice. The Court found dispositive the undisputed facts “that Shenandoah knew that he was required to register under New York law” and that New York law “mandated that he update his registration if he traveled or moved out of state and that he register in the new state.” It was immaterial that the notice provided by New York’s registration form did not explain that a failure to register would be a violation of federal as well as state law. In a related holding, the Court concluded that SORNA is not a “specific intent law,” rejecting the argument that the indictment failed to allege a prima facie violation.

Nor was the Court impressed by the argument that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause powers. Citing three categories of activity that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), identified as within Congress’s authority to regulate, the Court found that SORNA was a valid regulation of “persons in interstate commerce” and of the “use of the channels of interstate commerce.” It reasoned that Shenandoah’s relocation made him “undeniably a ‘person … in interstate commerce.'” As to the regulation of “use,” the Court quoted a 1925 decision of the Supreme Court upholding Congress’s power to “forbid or punish use of interstate commerce ‘as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin.’”

The Tenth Amendment did not require reversal, the Court next held, because the defendant, as a private party, had no standing to assert any challenge to federal encroachment on state sovereignty.

The Court concluded its merits analysis by rejecting the defendant’s claim that SORNA infringed upon his constitutional right to travel. The Court reasoned that the defendant “may travel interstate, but when he does, must register in the new state.… [M]oving from one jurisdiction to another entails many registration requirements required by law which may cause some inconvenience, but which do not unduly infringe upon anyone’s right to travel.” The Court also found it “worth noting” that the right to travel “is not an absolute right,” and that the burden imposed by SORNA “is necessary to achieve a compelling interest.… in preventing future sex crimes.”

The Court left open a possibility of a successful challenge on the part of a narrow class of persons “who, for various reasons, did not have a registration requirement prior to the passage of SORNA.” Such persons, it indicated, would have standing to challenge a series of implementing regulations adopted by the Attorney General in 2007 and 2008 to clarify SORNA’s application. As to this defendant, the Court held that the regulations were inapplicable.

Circuit Reverses Grant of Acquittal in Drug Conspiracy

United States v. Boria, No. 08-2550, 2009 WL 282088 (Jan. 26, 2010). Following a jury verdict of guilty on charges of aiding and abetting and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, the district court entered a judgment of acquittal, finding the evidence of his knowledge of the objective of the conspiracy, i.e. the transportation of cocaine, insufficient. The Circuit reversed, holding that the conconspirator’s "crucial" testimony, combined with suspicious circumstances under which defendant became involved with the tractor-trailer carrying the drugs, established that defendant knew drugs were involved.

The evidence at trial showed that another conspirator, Diaz, brought to Philadelphia a tractor-trailer which contained one hundred kilograms of cocaine. A DEA informant, Alvarado, received a phone call from another conspirator, Morel, who was searching for a garage which could fit a tractor-trailer for unloading. Alvarado met with Morel and four other Mexican nationals, none of which were Boria. An overnight parking location was chosen. The next morning Alvarado returned to the parking lot to take Diaz to breakfast. When the two arrived at the diner, Alvarado received a phone call from Morel informing Alvarado that he had sent someone to take the tractor-trailer to a garage for unloading. Alvarado testified that he was told by Morel that Boria "was supposed to take the tractor-trailer from [Alvarado] and take it to a garage to unload the drugs that were in the back of the tractor-trailer." On cross, Alvarado maintained that Boria was responsible for "taking the truck from [his] hands to take it to another garage to unload it," and for "tak[ing] the driver of the tractor-trailer to finish off what needs to be done inside the truck." Morel informed Alvarado and Diaz that this man would identify himself as "Ruben," and Alvarado identified Boria as Ruben. When Alvarado and Diaz pulled into the parking lot. Boria identified himself as Ruben and confirmed that Morel had sent him. Alvarado acknowledged he had never before seen Boria. Diaz then climbed into the driver's side of the truck and Boria climbed into the passenger's side. The truck left its location with Alvarado following, at Morel's request, and eventually stopped in a K-Mart parking lot. Alvarado exited his car and approached the truck to ask Boria why they had stopped there because it was a "hot area." When Alvarado reached the tractor, Boria was on his cell phone. After Boria hung up, Alvarado asked where the truck was heading. Boria responded that he was going to a garage in North Philadelphia, but that he was waiting for someone to open it. When the truck pulled out of the parking lot, it was stopped by the police, who had been observing the truck since receiving Alvarado's tip. Police gained access to the locked trailer portion with a key on the ring they found in the ignition. After three hours of searching, the police located one hundred kilograms of cocaine hidden in boxes, which themselves were hidden in the middle of the trailer within pallets of mostly rotten fruit.

The District Court entered a judgment of acquittal for Boria finding the evidence of his knowledge of the objective of the conspiracy, i.e. the transportation of cocaine, insufficient. The court found: "there was no evidence that Mr. Boria was engaged in, or present during, any conversations about the cocaine that was hidden in the back of the trailer; no probative evidence of the substance of any communications in which Mr. Boria engaged; no evidence that Mr. Boria ever ‘possessed’ or saw the cocaine, or that he ever saw the back of the trailer unlocked; no evidence of any prior relationship between Mr. Boria and any co-conspirators; and no evidence that Mr. Boria previously had been involved in any drug-trafficking activities."

In reversing, the Circuit held that a rational trier of fact could infer that Boria knew drugs were involved based on Alvarado's testimony and the suspicious circumstances under which Boria became associated with the tractor-trailer. Boria was responsible for taking the truck for unloading, but first had to arrange a garage. He knew exactly which truck to approach, confirmed Morel had sent him, and began directing the truck to a garage. A reasonable juror could conclude, based on this arrangement, that Boria knew something criminal was afoot. Alvarado's testimony that Boria was responsible for unloading the drugs, attributable to Boria as a co-conspirator, then serves as the crucial additional fact imputing knowledge of drugs, as opposed to some other form of contraband. Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could have found Boria guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine.

Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for State Defendants in Delaware Lethal Injection Case

Jackson v. Danberg, No. 09-1925 and 09-2052 (Feb. 1, 2010). In a § 1983 class action challenging the constitutionality of lethal injection in Delaware, neither (1) Delaware’s record of errors in implementing its execution protocol, nor (2) the absence of a planned alternative to peripheral venous access, show a substantial risk of serious harm under the standard announced in Baze v. Rees. The District Court’s order of summary judgment for the state defendants is affirmed, and the stay of executions pending appeal is dissolved.

In this long (47-page) opinion, the Third Circuit holds that the practice of lethal injection in Delaware is constitutional under Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). The Supreme Court held in Baze that the standard governing method-of-execution claims brought under § 1983 is whether the challenged practice poses a "substantial risk of serious harm" to the condemned prisoner. Finding no such risk in Delaware, the Third Circuit affirms the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the state defendants, and dissolves the stay of executions that had been in place since the beginning of this litigation, in May 2006. Although the opinion notes that "the worrisome course [Delaware] appears to have taken at times under its formal protocol . . . gives us great pause," Slip op., 46, it nonetheless gives the green light for executions to resume in Delaware.

The opinion is notable for its lengthy discussion of the plurality opinion and the multiple concurring and dissenting opinions in Baze, although both parties in this case had agreed that the applicable standard was the plurality’s "substantial risk of serious harm" standard. The opinion then discusses the plaintiffs’ substantive claims: first, that the record of failures to comply with the execution protocol shows an unconstitutional risk of similar failures in the future; and second, that Defendants’ failure to adopt alternatives to peripheral venous access, for the foreseeable possibility that the executioners will be unable to establish peripheral access in a condemned prisoner, also show unconstitutional risk.

With regard to the plaintiffs’ evidence of Delaware’s failures to conduct a single of the 13 executions by lethal injection without deviating from the written protocol, the opinion finds that none of the mistakes shows a substantial risk. The court opens by saying, "the record is bereft of evidence that any of the thirteen inmates Delaware has executed using the three-drug protocol was still conscious when injected with potassium chloride." Slip op., 35, but then acknowledges that the evidentiary proffer regarding the Brian Steckel execution was disputed before the District Court, and some "evidence indicat[ed] that he had not received the appropriate dosage" of the anesthetic. Slip op., 36. The opinion then states, "Even assuming that Steckel suffered great pain during his botched execution, however, does no preclude summary judgment for Delaware, as Baze left no room for doubt that a single instance of mistake does not suffice to demonstrate a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. The court finds Plaintiffs’ other evidence of noncompliance with the written protocol, such as failure to follow the requirements for the training of execution personnel, similarly does not show unconstitutional risk.
Plaintiffs’ second claim was that Delaware’s failure to provide for an alternative to venous access poses a risk of a failed execution, similar to what happened when Ohio tried, and failed, to execute Romell Broom in September 2009. The panel relies on Baze, which did not require a backup plan, to hold that this does not render Delaware’s protocol unconstitutional.

Finally, the opinion comments on the Defendants’ cross-appeal issue: the District Court’s
grant of a stay pending appeal. While acknowledging that the District Court’s potential reasons continuing the stay are obvious, the panel "encourage[s] district courts int his circuit to state their reasons for granting stays pending appeal." Slip op., 46.

Submitted by Maria Pulzetti

Court Upholds Denial of IA Claim: No Evidentiary Hearing was Necessary and Petitioner Failed to Show Prejudice

In Palmer v. Hendricks, No. 06-2991 (3rd Cir. Jan. 26, 2010), the Third Circuit affirms the district court’s denial of habeas relief on Palmer’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to testify. Petitioner failed to show prejudice resulting from counsel’s failure to advise him of his right to testify, where petitioner’s factual proffer regarding this ineffectiveness claim did not include a proffer of his testimony, had he received proper advice and chosen to testify.

The Circuit also affirmed the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Palmer raised this claim in state post-conviction proceedings, and the state court held that, based on the record, Palmer had been informed sufficiently during trial of his right to testify. The state court based this on the transcript, which showed one time trial counsel requested and received time to consult with his client, and also showed that the judge read to Palmer, and later to the jury, the instruction on a criminal defendant’s election not to testify. The state court reasoned that if Palmer understood the choice not to testify, he understood that he had the choice to testify.

This opinion is most notable for Section III.A.1, a lengthy discussion of evidentiary hearings in federal habeas. The Third Circuit restates the standard for an evidentiary hearing in federal court, although it finds that Palmer was not improperly denied such a hearing:

because Palmer’s petition does not contain sufficient "factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief," the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining Palmer’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

The longer discussion of Landrigan, however, includes what the opinion describes as a "consideration" for a District Court to make when deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing: "‘if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.’ Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474." This is only the second time the Third Circuit has relied upon that language; the first time was in Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007), another Fuentes opinion.
Two additional things stand out in this section: first, the opinion ignores the previous week’s decision in Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. ___ , No. 08-9156 (Jan. 20, 2010), which of course was not decided under § 2254(e)(2). Second, in footnote four, the court states that Palmer was diligent in developing his claim in state court, and affirms that the "failure to develop" language in 2254(e)(2) is defeated where a petitioner makes a factual proffer (in this case, via affidavit) and requests an evidentiary hearing.

In III.A.2, the opinion addresses the prejudice prong – somewhat ignoring the state court’s analysis of the deficient performance prong. "Notably, Palmer did not set forth the facts to which he would have testified had he taken the stand at his trial." Slip op., 8. Without such a proffer, the court holds, he cannot show prejudice. In III.A.3, the opinion notes that structural error does not arise from counsel’s failure to advise a defendant of the right to testify.

Submitted by Maria Pulzetti

Pennsylvania Resisting Arrest is Crime of Violence Under Begay

In United States v. Stinson, No. 08-1717, the Third Circuit recently ruled that Pennsylvania Resisting Arrest is a crime of violence under Begay. The Pennsylvania statue specifies two ways in which a defendant may resist arrest: (1) by creating a substantial risk of bodily injury to an officer or another; or (2) by employing means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance. The Court held that the first "fits squarely within the definition of a crime of violence in the residual clause." Under Begay, the Court had to analyze whether the second "typically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." The Court held that it does.


"Such conduct poses as great or greater a risk as burglary or extortion . . . . [R]esisting arrest necessarily involves confronting the authority of a police officer who is likely armed and charged with defending the public . . . . [T]he offense engenders a significant risk of conflict and, correspondingly, a significant risk of injury." It is "by definition, purposeful, aggressive and violent," because the statute requires "the intent of preventing a public servant from effectuating a lawful arrest . . . . and knowingly engaging in conflict with another." [Note: This seems to invoke the "powder keg" theory rejected by the Supreme Court in Chambers. The Court purports to distinguish resisting arrest from its walk-away escape decision, Hopkins, in a footnote, however: "[Misdemeanor escape 'is conduct materially less violent and aggressive than the enumerated offenses." . . . Such is not the case with resisting arrest."]


Stinson had argued that because resisting arrest could include passive resistance, it should not be a categorical crime of violence, relying on Commonwealth v. Thompson, 922 A.2d 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), a case in which the defendant and her husband had interlocked arms and legs and refused to respond to commands of officers. The Court found that Thompson was "hardly passive," yelling and waving her hands in an attempt to scare an officer's horse, "causing the animal to rear up," and struggling with the officers "for a few minutes." The Court "found no decision . . . that affirmed a conviction for resisting arrest based on a defendant's inaction or simply 'lying down or 'going limp.'" [Note: This seems to ignore the reality that most resisting arrest prosecutions are resolved without a trial, so there are few reported cases.]

The Court then asserted that the "'ordinary' or 'typical' fact scenario underlying resisting arrest convictions in Pennsylvania" involves purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct.

This was a disappointing result, especially because the Court had granted panel rehearing of the first adverse decision. The Third Circuit Defenders participated as amicus, and David McColgin, EDPA, presented very strong oral argument on behalf of Mr. Stinson.

Proper Unit of Prosecution under § 924(c) Is the Underlying Predicate Offense

United States v. Diaz, __ F.3d__, 2010 WL 143684 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2010). Nelson Diaz was convicted by a jury of two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking,in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and a single count of possession with intent to distribute heroin. The District Court sentenced Diaz to a term of 480 months imprisonment - the sum of consecutive sentences of 120 months for each firearm count and 240 months for possession with intent to distribute heroin. Nelson appealed, arguing that his convictions and consecutive sentences for the two firearm charges based on a single predicate offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Third Circuit agreed. Consistent with nine other Courts of Appeals, the Circuit held that the proper "unit of prosecution" under the statute is the underlying predicate offense – in this case the drug distribution count – rather than the possession of a firearm. The Court recognized that two other Circuits have taken the opposite view, that the unit of prosecution is the firearm possession (or use), and that the language of the statute and legislative history could be interpreted to support both sides. For these reasons, the Court looked to the rule of lenity in reaching its decision, finding "without hesitation that ‘[a]fter ‘seiz[ing] everything from which aid can be derived’ we are ‘left with an ambiguous statute,’" and adding, "[a]pplication of the rule of lenity is particularly appropriate in the context of § 924(c) because of its mandatory consecutive sentences and extremely harsh penalties for subsequent convictions."

Court Continues to Require Careful Tailoring of Internet Restrictions on Sex Offenders

In United States v. Heckman, 08-3844, the Third Circuit extended its line of precedent (Crandon, Freeman, Voelker, Thielemann) requiring district courts to carefully tailor internet restrictions for sex offenders on supervised release. Heckman had a lengthy history of child molestation, but he had never been convicted of using the internet to entice or exploit a child -- the type of conduct the Court has previously said is essential to supporting Internet bans. Nonetheless, on the instant conviction for transporting child pornography, the district court imposed a lifetime, unconditional ban on Internet access. The Court rejected this condition, refusing to make the "inferential leap" that Heckman would eventually progress to using the Internet directly to harm a child. The Court also noted that there are alternative, less restrictive means of controlling an offender's Internet use, including computer monitoring conditions. The Court made clear, however, that it was not holding that limited Internet bans of shorter duration can never be imposed as conditions of supervised release in child pornography cases.

The Court rejected Heckman's challenge to a mental health condition that he had argued impermissibly delegated too much authority to Probation. It read the condition as requiring participation in mental health treatment, leaving only the details to be set by Probation, which is permissible under the Court's precedent in Pruden. The government had conceded that a condition governing contact with minors was impermissible because it gave full discretion over Heckman's contact with minors (including his own family members) to Probation.

Congratulations to Christy Unger, EDPA, for the win!

En Banc Court to Revisit Construction of Federal Conspiracy Statute

On the government’s request, the Circuit has ordered en banc review of the decision in US v. Rigas, No. 08-3218 (Oct. 21, 2009) (original Third Circuit Blog post here). The order granting review, filed January 13, directs that the sole issue is "whether the two clauses in 18 U.S.C. § 371 – the ‘offense’ clause and the ‘defraud’ clause – constitute separate offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution." (More fully, the statute begins: "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States....")

The issue split the original panel. In an opinion by Judge Fuentes, the majority held that the conspiracy statute creates a single statutory offense, while Judge Rendell, in dissent, construed the statute to create distinct ones. Both opinions recognized a circuit split on the issue, although the judges offered different counts: the majority found a 4-3 split in favor of its rule, while the dissent tallied a 2-1 split to opposite effect. (The disagreement owed to conflicting views regarding the scope of certain rulings.)

The case involves the high-profile prosecution of members of the Rigas family on charges of diverting funds from Adelphia Communications Corporation for personal use. Until its collapse in 2002, Adelphia was the country’s sixth largest cable operator.

Intentional 45 month delay in bringing defendant to trial violated defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights

In a rare reversal of a district court's speedy trial decision, the Third Circuit in United States v. Battis, 08-2949 (3d Cir. December 14, 2009), concluded that the government's intentional 45 month delay in bringing the defendant to trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Court reversed the district court's judgment denying defendant's speedy trial motion and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment and vacate the defendant's conviction.

The case arose out of a bar fight in Philadelphia. The defendant, Germaine Battis, was arrested by Philadelphia police for, among other things, illegally possessing a firearm. He was arraigned in state court on January 20, 2004. One month later, on February 24, 2004, Battis was indicted in federal court for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A federal bench warrant was issued as a detainer because Battis was in state custody, but the detainer was never formally filed. Battis was not arraigned in federal court until November 2, 2006. In the interim, state officials were waiting for the federal government to proceed with its case, while federal prosecutors intentionally delayed prosecution in order for the state court case to proceed against Battis. It was not until September 18, 2006, when the state court dismissed the state charges against Battis on speedy trial grounds, that federal prosecutors finally began to proceed with their case.

Battis filed a motion to dismiss the federal case on speedy trial ground, but the motion was denied by the district court. His case proceeded to trial and he was ultimately convicted of being a felon-in-possession. On June 23, 2008, he was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment. On appeal, the Third Circuit weighed the four Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) constitutional speedy trial factors anew and determined that Battis's constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated. First, the Court calculated the length of the delay as 45 months, measured from the date of the federal indictment through the beginning of the trial. The Court affirmatively ruled that a defendant's arrest on related state charges does not trigger the speedy trial protection for a subsequent federal charge. The length of this delay was more than sufficient to trigger speedy trial protection. Second, the reason for the delay, weighed against the government. The Court found that the government’s justification, deference to the state’s interest in prosecution, failed in this case because while an "initial delay to allow the state to proceed may have been valid, there came a time when the federal Government should have taken some action to proceed in light of the state authorities' inaction."

The third factor, whether defendant asserted his speedy trial right, weighed in the defendant’s favor. The Court noted that Battis notified authorities on four occasions that he wanted his federal case to proceed, and addressed three requests for a speedy trial to the court. Notably, federal counsel made a request within weeks of being appointed. Finally, the Court held that "prejudice will be presumed when there is a forty-five-month delay in bringing a defendant to trial, even when it could be argued that only thirty-five months of that delay is attributable to the Government" and that in this case the government was not able to rebut this presumption. Battis's preparation for the state case during the delay did not alleviate any prejudice even though the charges in the state case were based on essentially the same facts as the federal charges, as this did not address the reason for presuming prejudice-that the delay undermines the basic reliability of the trial and the concerns of Battis's counsel in the two cases, and their resulting investigative efforts, would necessarily have been different. Moreover, the threat to the reliability of a trial is especially high where, as here, the delay results in the defendant's not being appointed counsel for three years after indictment.
　
The Court thus concluded that Battis was presumptively prejudiced by the delay, that all four factors of the Barker test weighed against the government, and that Battis was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to a speedy trial.

Congratulations to the Defender Association of Philadelphia's Federal Court Division on this tremendous win!

Rehabilitation cannot be used to justify term of imprisonment, even if other factors are cited as well

The Third Circuit this week, in U.S. v. Hoffa, No. 08-3920 (3d Cir. 12/2/09), reiterated that 18 U.S.C. 3582(a) prohibits courts from using rehabilitation (including medical treatment) to justify imprisonment or to set the amount of imprisonment that will be served. The Court had previously so held in U.S. v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2007). But in Manzella, rehabilitation was the only justification given, whereas the district court in Hoffa cited rehabiliation as well as incapacitation. The Court saw no distinction, holding that the plain meaning of 3582(a) prohibits the use of rehabiliation as "a factor" in imprisonment descisions.

The Court again pointed out, as it did in Manzella, that rehabiliation can play a role in fashioning the overall sentence (including probation/release conditions, program recommendations during imprisonment, etc), but just not in determining the fact or length of any imprisonment portion of the sentence.

PA Simple Assault = crime of violence under knowing/intentional part of statute

In US v. James Henry Johnson, No. 08-3693 (3d Cir. 11/18/09), the Circuit examined whether simple assault under Pennsylvania statute is a crime of violence for purposes of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). The Court, while stating that it was not actually ruling on the issue, expressly doubted that a simple assault committed recklessly could be a crime of violence in light of US v. Begay, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008). But the Court did rule that simple assault committed knowingly or intentionally does qualify as a crime of violence. It remanded for a resentencing hearing at which the district court is to determine whether Johnson’s prior conviction for simple assault was for the part of the statute charging knowing and intentional conduct, as opposed to reckless conduct.

Johnson was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the Court enhanced the guidelines range by counting Johnson’s prior simple assault conviction as a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). The Third Circuit in US v. Dorsey, 174 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 1999), had ruled the simple assault does qualify as a crime of violence, even though the offense can be committed recklessly.

On appeal, the Circuit, in a lengthy footnote, explained that under Begay, only "purposeful, violent and aggressive" conduct can count as a crime of violence. This "suggest[s] that a crime committed recklessly is not a crime of violence," as nearly every other Circuit has already held. The government on appeal conceded the issue, explaining that the Department of Justice position now is that "reckless conduct, standing alone, is not the type of purposeful conduct that can constitute a crime of violence." Thus, the government conceded that Dorsey is no longer good law in light of Begay.

Normally such a concession would make the Court’s resolution of the issue easier. But here, for reasons that are not made clear in the opinion, the Court took the government’s concession as a reason not to resolve the issue. Instead, the Court ruled that knowing or intentional simple assault would qualify as a crime of violence, and it remanded to the district court to determine under the "categorical approach" whether Johnson’s conviction was under this part of the statute. If not, then in light of the DOJ’s concession, the prior conviction as reckless simple assault cannot count as a crime of violence. The Court made clear that this categorical determination is not a factual one but instead solely a question of what part of the statute Johnson actually pled guilty to: "[W]hat matters is the mens rea to which Johnson actually pleaded guilty," and not the facts in the Presentence Report suggesting the conduct was intentional.

Most likely, the Court’s reason for not expressly resolving the recklessness issue is because the same issue is currently pending in two other cases before the Court, and this panel wanted to leave the issue for resolution in one of those cases.

For Purposes of Double Jeopardy, General Conspiracy Statute Creates Single Offense that May Be Committed in Two Ways

In United States v. Rigas, No. 08-3218 (3d Cir., 10/21/2009) , the defendants, members of the Rigas family, were charged with participating in a fraudulent scheme effectuated through their ownership of Adelphia Communications. The defendants were indicted, inter alia, for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 in two separate jurisdictions for the conduct underlying this fraudulent scheme. Specifically, in 2002, the Southern District of New York indicted the defendants for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, namely securities fraud, based upon their misuse of corporate funds for personal expenses. In 2005, the Middle District of Pennsylvania charged the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States via income tax evasion, based upon their failure to pay income tax on monies they illegally obtained from Adelphia. The defendants argued that the Pennsylvania indictment violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Relying upon Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Third Circuit joined the majority of circuits to rule that 18 U.S.C. § 371 proscribes one offense which may be committed two ways. (Judge Rendell in dissent, however, relied upon Blockburger to find that § 371 creates two separate offenses.) The court also reiterated that the Clause prohibits the government from splitting a single conspiracy into several prosecutions. Citing United States v. Liotard, 817 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.1987) and United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007), the court ultimately remanded the case to allow the lower court to determine whether the defendants entered into two separate agreements or only one.

The defendants also challenged the Pennsylvania prosecution for the substantive counts of tax evasion on grounds of collateral estoppel. Specifically, the defendants argued that, since the New York jury found them not guilty of some of the wire and bank fraud counts, the jury must have believed that the monies obtained by the defendants from Adelphia were loans and not income. However, the court recognized that the New York jury acquitted the defendants on only a few of the enumerated transactions. Consequently, the government could prosecute the defendants in Pennsylvania for tax evasion in relation to the remaining transactions.

Indictment Alleging Honest Services Fraud Sufficient Where Charges Allege Intentional Violation of Clearly Defined Fiduciary Duty

The issue in United States v. McGeehan, Nos. 05-1954 & 05-2446 (3d Cir.,10/22/2009) , was whether the defendants, the President/CEO and Vice-President/COO of a publicly-funded, non-profit corporation, could be prosecuted for “honest services” fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 and 1346. The defendants ran the Ben Franklin Technology Center (hereinafter “BFTC”). The purpose of BFTC was to administer funds provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for other organizations in an effort to foster the development and commercialization of new technology. One of BFTC’s clients during the course of this fraudulent scheme was the U.S. Navy. The government indicted the defendants for defrauding BFTC of their honest services by misusing BFTC funds for personal expenditures and thwarting the efforts of subordinate employees to investigate their actions. The indictment also charged the defendants with depriving the U.S. Navy of the honest services of BFTC. In essence, the government sought to extend the honest services fraud theory to non-public officials. The court ultimately concluded that both public and private officials owe a fiduciary duty to the public. Specifically, the court determined that, as public officials owe a duty to protect the common good, private officials have a duty of protection as well, albeit a duty that is based primarily upon economic concerns. The court concluded that the defendants owed a fiduciary duty to BFTC by virtue of their status as corporate officers. The court ultimately ruled that this fiduciary duty could serve as the basis for the charge of honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 and 1346, where the defendants were charged with executing a fraudulent scheme which breached this fiduciary duty and deprived BFTC of their honest services.

However, the court ruled that, while the indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendants committed honest services fraud against BFTC, the indictment did not sufficiently charge that the defendants committed honest services fraud against the U.S. Navy. Unlike BFTC, the defendants’ relationship with the Navy did not create a fiduciary duty. To the contrary, the relationship between the defendants and the Navy was merely contractual. The court ruled that the government must allege more than a breach of contractual obligations in order to charge a non-public official with honest services fraud.

Shoupe Departures Applicable to Criminal History Only, Not Offense Level

In United States v. Grier, No. 07-3507 (3d Cir., 10/26/2009) ,the defendant challenged the district court’s ruling that it did not have the authority to reduce his offense level as an overstatement of the seriousness of his offense, pursuant to § 4A1.3. Prior to 2003, the Third Circuit had interpreted U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 to permit a downward departure from a defendant’s career offender status if the court found that the career offender designation over-represented his criminal history. In United States v. Shoupe, 35 F.3d 835 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit had ruled that, in the absence of a definition for the term "departing" as used in § 4A1.3, this section permitted a downward departure to both the criminal history category as well as the offense level. However, in 2003, the Sentencing Commission amended § 4A1.3 to provide a specific downward departure where the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of his criminal history or his likelihood of recidivism. The 2003 amendments also provided a definition of the term "departure" as used in the amended version of § 4A1.3. Pursuant to the 2003 amendments, § 1B1.1 now provides a definition of the term "departure" that specifically addresses the downward departure provided in § 4A1.3. The definition provided in the current § 1B1.1 for the term "departure" as used in § 4A1.3 addresses only the assignment of the criminal history category. The court in Grier concluded that the 2003 amendments superseded Shoupe.

Also, the government had argued that Shoupe was no longer good law after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) and United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). The court, however, concluded that Shoupe was not impacted by Booker and Gunter because a consideration of Shoupe departures falls squarely within Step Two of the three-step process mandated by Booker, namely, formally ruling on any departure motions.

Third is First of Circuits to Address Constitutionality of AEPA: Denies First Amendment Challenges

In a case of first impression nationally, the Third Circuit in United States v. Fullmer, et al., No. 06-4211, upheld the Animal Enterprise Protection Act ("AEPA") against First Amendment challenges. The defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions in this case, which involved charges of violating the act, interstate stalking, using telecommunications devices to abuse/threaten/harass, and conspiracy to do all of the same. The Court affirmed the convictions of the organization, Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty ("SHAC"), and six individuals charged: the President of SHAC, the Campaign Coordinator for SHAC, the web creator/manager for SHAC, the Seattle branch manager for SHAC, a SAC activist who coordinated protests, and a SHAC Huntingdon campaign organizer in NJ.

A complete recitation of the facts from the Court’s 60-page opinion is not possible here. In brief: Huntingdon Life Sciences is a research corporation that performs testing for companies bringing products to market. Its labs use animals as test subjects. After animal abuse inside a Huntingdon lab in England was documented in the late 1990s, animal rights organizations began targeting the company. One of those organizations was Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty - UK ("SHAC-UK").

In the wake of an a brutal assault on its Managing Director by a member of SHAC-UK, Huntingdon relocated its financial base to the United States, where laws better protected the confidentiality of its shareholders, whom SHAC-UK had begun to target in the England. When a Huntingdon branch opened in New Jersey, SHAC formed a branch there, as well.

SHAC targeted Huntingdon, companies that were involved with Huntingdon, and people who worked for both Huntingdon and the affiliated companies. Its primary tool was its website, through which members coordinated protests. It posted the names, home addresses and home phone numbers of employees on the website. The web-page also included pages describing: (1) upcoming "direct action" – protests such as the activities at issue in this case; (2) previous "accomplishments" – for example, acts of vandalism committed by protesters; (3) "top 10 terror tactics," like smashing windows and firebombing cars; (4) how to evade investigators through techniques like encryption; and (5) "electronic civil disobedience" – such as inundating websites with email to crash servers or using "black faxes" to exhaust toner. The government’s evidence showed the cyberattacks cost Huntingdon $400,000 in lost business, $50,000 in staffing costs for repairs, and $15,000 in computer replacement costs.

Constitutionality of the AEPA: Void for Vagueness: The AEPA prohibits travel in interstate commerce or use of the mail or other facility in or interstate commerce for the purpose of causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise that intentionally damages or causes the loss of property used by the animal enterprise (or conspiracy to do so). Defendants argued that the terms "economic damage" and "physical disruption" were not clearly defined," and included activities protected by the first amendment. The Court rejected these arguments because (1) "physical disruption has a well-understood common definition; (2) legal protest, such as letter-writing, which might cause an ancillary physical disruption is exempted from the statute; (3) defendants’ behavior – including encryption, evasion techniques, and even concessions on the website that some activities were illegal – suggests they knew their activities were illegal; and (4) the "intent" requirement means that the government must establish that the actor meant to disrupt the functioning of the enterprise, which alleviates vagueness concerns (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007)).

As-Applied Constitutional Challenge to AEPA: All parties agreed that, to the extent they advocated humane treatment of animals, the postings on the website fit within the rubric of the First Amendment. The question was whether they were directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless acting and likely to produce such action. Put differently, did they constitute a "true threat." Much of the speech did not. But the Court found the postings encouraging electronic civil disobedience and the dissemination of the personal information of Huntingdon employees was "more problematic."

Regarding the electronic civil disobedience, the Court held that the postings "encouraged and compelled an imminent unlawful act that was not only likely to occur, but provided the schedule by which the unlawful act was to occur. This type of communication is not protected speech." It found "ample evidence" to demonstrate that the individual defendants coordinated and controlled and participated in such activities.

Regarding dissemination of names and protests against target employees, the Court held that the defendants used past incidents to instil fear in future targets. For example, using photos of assault victims at protests. Viewed in context, the implied threats against target employees were not conditional and rightly instilled fear in the listeners, converting them to "true threats." The Court gave examples of particular instances in this category involving each defendant.

Definition of "Animal Enterprises": Defendants argued that the protest activity against companies associated with Huntingdon was not directed at "animal enterprises." The Court disagreed, finding that the "ultimate object" of the conspiracy was Huntingdon.

Actual v. Intended Loss: Defendants argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict them for intended loss. The Court did not decide this issue, instead finding that any error would have been harmless because the government proved an actual loss in excess of the statutory threshold.

Sufficiency of Evidence/Conspiracy: Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that they acted for the purpose of causing physical disruption to Huntingdon and to intentionally damage or cause the loss of Huntingdon’s property. The Court conceded that there was no direct evidence to prove a conspiracy between the defendants, but found "ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred their agreement," to accomplish these unlawful goals. Judge Fisher dissented on this point, noting "I fail to see any evidence of an agreement to cause physical disruption to Huntingdon – as opposed to other non-animal enterprise companies affiliated with Huntingdon – or to cause damage or loss to property used by Huntingdon.

Stalking: The defendants also challenged their stalking convictions. One argued that he only intended to harass and embarrass the victims and make their lives miserable. He contrasted this type of infliction of emotional distress with the statute’s requirement that he intend to put his victims "in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury." The Court found that the invocation of the the website’s references to extreme acts of violence, coupled with protesters' use of ultimatums, went beyond harassment and embarrassment. Another defendant argued that the victims’ fears were unreasonable. The Court dismissed this argument for the same reason, adding that this particular defendant had personally threatened to burn one victim’s house down. The web administrator argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any stalking-related counts. The Court found that the jury could reasonably have concluded that he aided and abetted the stalking because the website was a primary tool in it.

The Court also summarily rejected a variety of other challenges in this complicated and hard-fought case.

Defendant properly prosecuted and sentenced under federal chemical weapons statute after strategically employing toxic chemicals with intent to harm

Defendant Carol Anne Bond, a trained microbiologist, attempted, on at least 24 different occasions, to poison a former friend with toxic chemicals stolen from her employer after Bond learned that her friend had gotten pregnant and that Bond's husband was the baby's father. Bond was charged with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), and two counts of mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Bond moved to suppress certain evidence and to dismiss the two chemical weapons charges under the Tenth Amendment on federalism and fair notice grounds. Following the district court's denial of her motions, Bond pled guilty to all the charges, reserving her right to appeal.

(1) Federalism Challenge

Section 229 was enacted in response to the multi-national Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. It prohibits individuals from, among other things, acquiring, owning, possessing or using any chemical weapon. Section 229 neither has a requisite federal interest element, nor states any basis for its enactment beyond the Chemical Weapons Convention. On appeal, Bond asserted that 18 U.S.C. § 229 violated constitutional principles of federalism because it was not based on a valid exercise of congressional authority, it did not require proof of a federal interest, it was vague and overbroad, and it failed to provide fair notice of the conduct covered by its terms.

The Third Circuit, in United States v. Bond, No. 08-2677, declined to reach the merits of Bond's federalism challenge to Section 229 because it concluded that private parties lack standing to claim that the federal Government is impinging on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment, absent the involvement of a state or its officers as a party or parties. The Court also rejected Bond's vagueness claim, finding that, while the terms of Section 229 were certainly broad, a person of reasonable intelligence would know that Bond's conduct violated the statute and that the statute cast a wide net for obvious safety reasons and did not criminalize protected activities outside the permissible bounds of Congressional regulation.

(2) Appropriateness of "Special Skill" Sentence Enhancement

Bond also challenged a two-level sentence enhancement for use of a special skill. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the enhancement, finding that Bond's advanced degree in microbiology, her training in the development and application of biocides, and her position at a chemical manufacturing company, where she could research and steal chemicals unavailable to the public, all supported the enhancement. Bond's background and training facilitated her handling and deployment of the chemicals in a fashion thought to be most lethal and influenced her decision to use toxic chemicals as her weapon of revenge. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed application of the special skill enhancement.

Entry of dual convictions for bank robbery and armed bank robbery violated Double Jeopardy Clause

Defendant Donald Cesare pled guilty to a two-count information charging him with bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)). He was sentenced, over defense counsel's objection, to two concurrent terms of 53 months imprisonment and ordered to pay a special assessment of $200 - $100 for each count. On appeal, the Government conceded that Cesare improperly received concurrent sentences in violation of double jeopardy because bank robbery is a lesser included offense of armed bank robbery, but argued that the two separate $100 special assessments be left intact because special assessments are not punishment.

The Third Circuit, in United States v. Cesare, No. 08-2749, disagreed with the Government's position regarding the special assessments, holding that the entry of separate convictions, including separate special assessments, threatened the defendant with "potential adverse collateral consequences." As such, the two separate special assessments constituted impermissible double punishments offending double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded this matter to the district court with instructions to vacate the defendant's armed robbery conviction.

Plain error when district court, after granting downward departure, imposes sentence higher than bottom of pre-departure Guidelines range.

Representing criminal defendants in sentencing, "you can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes [and sometimes even if you don’t try in the district court], you might find you get what you need". In United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, No. 08-3222 (filed October 2, 2009), the Third Circuit held that a defendant was entitled to re-sentencing when the District Court imposed a sentence that failed to provide defendant the benefit of a 5K1.1 departure that it had already granted him.

Following his indictment for drug trafficking, defendant – who ultimately pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement – provided DEA agents with information concerning a fellow drug trafficker, and later testified before a grand jury. Based on this substantial assistance, the Government, before sentencing, moved for a one-level downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.

At the sentencing hearing, the District Court – in the first step of the Gunter sentencing process – properly calculated defendant’s offense level as 23 and criminal history category as I, yielding a Guidelines sentencing range of 46 to 57 months' imprisonment. Then, in Gunter step two, the District Court granted the Government’s 5K1.1 one-level downward departure motion: that reduction yielded a Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months' imprisonment. The District Court imposed a sentence of 48 months: at the upper end of the custody range that included the one-level departure, but also within the original, pre-departure custody range. Defendant did not object to the sentence.

On appeal, defendant argued that he was entitled to re-sentencing because the District Court committed plain error by imposing a sentence that was two months higher than the bottom of the original pre-departure Guidelines range, without any indication that it was applying an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Defendant argued that the District Court erroneously failed to give effect to the one-level departure that it granted when it imposed a sentence above the bottom of the pre-departure Guideline range.

The Third Circuit agreed. First, at Gunter step two, the District Court was required to calculate a sentence below the bottom of the otherwise applicable Guidelines range by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1.E (defining downward departure as a "departure that effects a sentence less than a sentence that could be imposed under the applicable guideline range or a sentence that is otherwise less than the guideline sentence."). Quoting its earlier decision in United States v. Floyd, 499 F.3d 308, 312-13, the Court ruled that when a district court grants a downward departure, the sentence it imposes "must be less than the bottom of the otherwise applicable Guidelines range." Here, where the post-departure 41 to 51 months Guidelines range overlapped with the original pre-departure 46 to 57 months Guidelines range, the District Court’s Gunter-step two calculation required a sentence less than 46 months. The District Court could have imposed a 48-month sentence only if the District Court explicitly supported an upward variance in reliance on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors– but the District Court did not do so here.

The Court further held that this sentence was plain error, because the Guidelines definition of "downward departure" was unequivocal, and clearly explicated in Floyd. The Court further held that this error was prejudicial because it was unclear whether the District court intended to vary the sentence upwards, or whether it failed to realize that it did not give defendant the benefit of the departure that it had granted. Significantly, the Court emphasized that "very few procedural errors by a District Court will fail to be prejudicial, even when the Court might reasonably have imposed the same sentence under the correct procedure. . . . [and] an error of procedure is seldom harmless."

In an Clean Air Act Case, the Judgments of Conviction and Sentence Are Affirmed

In United States v. Starnes/United States v. George, Nos. 07-3341/08-1691, September 24, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentences of two defendants whose appeals were not formally consolidated but arose from the same set of facts.

Both Starnes and George were prosecuted for asbestos related Clean Air Act violations and for related false statement violations. Both proceeded to trial by jury and, at its conclusion, moved for judgement of acquittal. Those motions were denied and each was convicted.

On appeal, the defendants first argued that the District Court erred in denying their motions for judgement of acquittal. The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the decision to grant or denya motion for judgement of acquittal exercised plenary review.

Starnes argued, as to the Clean Water Act violations, that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence that he was the "owner or operator" within the meaning of the statute. Third Circuit disagreed stating that in a civil enforcement proceeding, a "non-owner operator" is liable under the act "if he or she has ‘significant or substantial or real control and supervision of a project’" and that there is no difference in the criminal context. That based on the record, there was substantial evidence that Starnes "exercised significant control and supervision" over the project and that was sufficient to survive the motion for judgement of acquittal.

Second, Starnes and George both argued that the District Court erred in denying their motions for judgement of acquittal on the false-statement counts. Specifically that the Government’s evidence was insufficient as to "falsity" or "federal-government jurisdiction" - both necessary elements of a false statements violation. The Third Circuit quickly dismissed the arguments as to "falsity" indicating that both defendants arguments rested on the faulty premise that the defendants were charged and convicted of falsely representing the amounts of asbestos in the air samples taken from the site. To the contrary, the Government’s evidence was that the samples weren’t analyzed at all - a fact that went uncontested. As a result, the evidence was sufficient as to "falsity."

As to "federal-government jurisdiction" both defendants argued that the federal government lacked jurisdiction because the reports were sent to the Virgin Islands Housing Authority (VIHA), which wasn’t a federal agency. The Third Circuit quickly dismissed this claim as well stating that it’s enough that the statement pertains to a "matter in which the executive branch has ‘the power to exercise authority.’" In other words, the fact that the VIHA was funded by HUD was enough to satisfy "federal government jurisdiction."

George alone argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement count because, as he put it, the Government failed to demonstrate that he had the "specific intent" to violate the false statements statute. The Third Circuit rejected this argument as well. In doing so, the Court noted that the statute identified the mens rea as "knowingly and willfully" rather than "specific intent." The Court was not willing to decide whether "specific intent" was "shorthand" for "knowingly and willfully." Rather, the Court chose to focus on the generally accepted definitions of "knowingly" and "willfully" and applied them to the statute at hand. The Court concluded that "knowingly" requires the Government to prove the defendant had "knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." With analysis, the Court of Appeals eventually concluded that "willfully," as it is applied to the false statements context (§ 1001), requires the Government to prove the defendant had "knowledge of the general unlawfulness of the conduct at issue." Based on these standards, the evidence presented was sufficient to survive the motion for judgment of acquittal.

Third, both defendants challenged the district court’s decision to admit the testimony of a witness, David Dugan. The decision to admit or exclude evidence was reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dugan testified regarding asbestos samples he collected which had high levels of friable asbestos. The district court ruled his testimony was relevant to demonstrate dangerous levels of friable asbestos that were likewise present in buildings worked on by the defendants. The defendants, in turn, argued that the district court’s decision to admit this testimony was an abuse of discretion because the witness collected samples from a building they didn’t work on and his collection occurred at a much later date than the events that led to their prosecution. Again, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendants because the Government demonstrated that all of the buildings in the complex (including the ones worked on by the defendants and the one in which Dugan collected samples) were made of the same materials and had no structural changes - therefore a reasonable inference could be made that the buildings worked on had dangerous levels of asbestos. Consequently, the testimony was deemed admissible under FRE 401 and 402. Additionally, the Court of Appeals summarily rejected the argument that the testimony of Dugan was inadmissible under FRE 403 because there was no demonstration of "unfair prejudice."

Finally, both defendant’s appealed the district court’s determination of their sentences. The review of the district court’s sentencing decisions was for reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. And as the Court of Appeals put it, these arguments were "readily dispatched." (FISHER, JORDAN, and STAPLETON, opinion by FISHER).

A Civil Contempt Order, Which Confined the Defendant for 5 Years, Was Not a De Facto Criminal Contempt Order

In United States v. Harris, No. 08-1553, September 23, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Harris’ motion to vacate an order of civil contempt.

Harris and several co-conspirators were indicted on conspiracy and fraud counts arising from the production and distribution of fraudulent financial documents. Following his indictment, he and his co-conspirators filed bogus financial documents that purported to create liens against the judges and prosecutors in their cases. The Government moved for a restraining order, which was granted. Despite the restraining order, the conduct of Harris and his co-conspirators continued.

A show cause hearing was held, at the conclusion of which, Harris and his co-conspirators were held in civil contempt and ordered to be incarcerated until they stopped the activity involving the bogus financial documents. Harris’ co-conspirators ceased the activity - Harris did not. Consequently, his incarceration on the contempt order began thereafter in April of 2004. Several months later, Harris went to trial on the underlying federal charges and was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 188 months imprisonment.

Still, after the conviction, Harris continued to send out bogus financial documents - as a result, he remained incarcerated on the civil contempt order for the past 5 years, which has tolled the commencement of his 188 month term of imprisonment.

In 2007 Harris filed a pro se motion with the District Court arguing the lack of jurisdiction of the federal courts - the District Court interpreted the motion to be one requesting the termination of the civil contempt sentence. That motion was denied in 2008.

On appeal, Harris argued that the contempt order was a de facto order of criminal contempt (rather than civil contempt) and therefore argued that it must be lifted for two reasons: 1) that the district court cannot continue to hold him after the termination of his initial criminal proceeding; and 2) that due process provides a temporal limitation on the district court’s contempt authority. The Third Circuit rejected both arguments.

As to the first argument, the Court of Appeals held that the termination of the underlying proceeding did not render the contempt order moot - rather, the contempt order remains ripe until and when Harris ceases to harass the judges and prosecutors. Therefore the decision to deny the motion to vacate was not an abuse of discretion.

As to the second argument, the Court of Appeals refused to adopt Harris’ argument that his case was analogous to that of the recalcitrant witness who refused to testify - that the continued incarceration of one where there is "no substantial likelihood" they will ever comply, should cease. The Court held his circumstances distinguishable - that in his case, he held the keys to his release and that the Court would not "dissolve a lawful order ... merely because the contemnor persists in violating it."

The Court ultimately disagreed that the civil contempt order in Harris’ case became a de facto criminal contempt order holding that an "order of civil contempt will only become punitive if a contemnor is unable to comply with the order, or if the circumstances indicate that a court is maintaining the contempt for an impermissible punitive purpose." Here, Harris made the choice to continue the conduct - the civil contempt order is in place to coerce him to stop. Again, he has the keys to his release and the order does not, under these circumstances, violate due process.

In the concurring opinion, Judge DuBois, noted that when confinement pursuant to a civil contempt order ceases to become coercive it loses its remedial effect and becomes punitive and that under those circumstances the contemnor must be released and prosecuted for criminal contempt (with the right to a jury trial). Neither the majority nor Judge DuBois suggest a set time limit for release and subsequent criminal prosecution. Judge DuBois does, however, suggest that a district court in these circumstances must determine whether continued confinement continues to have the coercive effect - if not, then release and prosecute. (BARRY, SMITH, and DuBOIS, majority opinion by BARRY, concurring opinion by DuBOIS).