Friday, September 27, 2013

Funds Held In Individual Retirement Accounts and Joint Bank Accounts Are Available Funds Under Under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA).



            The Third Circuit held in United States v. Konrad, -- F. 3d --, 2013 WL 5289087 (3d Cir. September 20, 2013) that individual retirement funds (IRAs) and jointly held bank accounts are considered available funds under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.  § 3006A(a).  

            In this case, Joseph Konrad was appointed a federal public defender to represent him against charges of making false statements to the Federal Aviation Administration.  Disparities in CJA 23 Financial Affidavit and in his disclosure during his presentencing report interview revealed that Konrad did not disclose the value of his home ($258,000), underreported the value of his retirement accounts by more than $20,000, and underreported his household monthly income by $4,300.  Additionally, Mr. Konrad and his wife had several large joint accounts. The district court found he had sufficient funds to pay for an attorney and with full disclosure would not have been entitled to the services of the federal public defender.  In reaching this decision the court ruled that the money in his individual retirement accounts could be considered in determining his ability to pay for legal representation.  The Third Circuit affirmed.  The circuit court noted that liquidity is a major factor in determining an individual’s ability to pay for an attorney.  Although funds withdrawn early from an IRA are subject to a penalty, they can still be liquidated.  Similarly, funds are considered available when a person has control over them and authority to use them.  Mr. Konrad had access to funds from the joint accounts with his wife, and discretion to use them.  Accounts where both holders have authority to use funds are different from money held in a spouse’s individual account.  Here Mr. Konrad had authority to use the funds in the account. Therefore, these funds were available for legal expenses.   
             
             Mr. Konrad was ordered to repay $6,000 for his legal services by the district court.   He argued that he should only have to repay an amount based on the CJA rate of $125 an hour.  The Third Circuit disagreed holding that the CJA rate was under market value for a criminal defense attorney, and since Mr. Konrad did not qualify for a court appointed attorney, he could not take advantage of the subsidized rate.  The district court’s order was affirmed. This holding is consistent with other federal courts.

Tuesday, September 24, 2013

Death of Habeas Petitioner Moots Petition

In William A. Keitel v. Joseph Mazurkiewicz, et al., No. 12-4027 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013), Appellant Ketiel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 in the Western District of Pennsylvania, after he had been found guilty of various crimes in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in 1998, and both his direct appeal and PCRA action in the Pennsylvania courts had been unsuccessful. The District Court denied his petition, and Keitel appealed. Shortly before the appeal was scheduled to be heard, the parties notified the Court of Appeals that Keitel had died. Appellees sought to dismiss the appeal as moot; Keitel's family wanted to continue the appeal to "clear his name."

The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order denying the petition, remanding with instructions to dismiss as moot. The Court held that Keitel, having died, was no longer "in custody", thus rendering his habeas petition moot.

Monday, September 16, 2013

Sentencing courts are not limited to charged conduct, but may consider defendant's actual conduct, in determining whether defendant violated his supervised release

In United States v. Khalil Carter, Nos. 12-3754 & 12-3755 (3d Cir. Sept. 13, 2013), the Third Circuit addressed the question of what evidence a sentencing court may consider in the revocation context for determining the grade of a charged violation. Appellant Carter was charged with two violations of supervised release. One, a new state conviction for access device fraud, was indisputably a Grade B violation. The other, new state convictions for misdemeanor endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of a minor, was also a B violation unless the district court found that the offenses constituted crimes of violence as forcible sex offenses, which would result in a Grade A violation of supervised release. A Grade B violation resulted in a sentencing range of 6 to 12 months, while a Grade A violation produced a sentencing range of 27 to 33 months imprisonment.

In making its determination that Carter's misdemeanor charges constituted crimes of violence, the district examined evidence including the victim's statement, Carter's guilty plea transcript, a toxicology report on the victim, testimony by the victim's mother, and an oral statement by Carter. The court credited the mother's testimony, which indicated that Carter had taken the 13 year old victim out to dinner, provided her with alcohol, made inappropriate comments, and touched her genitals while she pretended to be asleep. On this evidence, the district court concluded that Carter's conduct amounted to a forcible sexual offense and, under the Guidelines, a "crime of violence" and a Grade A violation of supervised release.

On appeal, Carter contested the determination that his misdemeanor offenses constituted a Grade A violation of supervised release because he had not been charged with a forcible sex offense. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, clarifying that a district court is not limited to the actual charges or convictions in determining the grade of a violation in the revocation context, but may consider the defendant's actual conduct. In fact, a revocation can proceed without charges even being filed. Accordingly, the sentencing court was permitted to rely on the facts presented at the revocation hearing in analyzing the nature of Carter's violation, and was not limited by the charges filed or the offenses of conviction.

However, in determining that Carter committed a forcible sex offense under the Guidelines, the district court failed to name the forcible sex offense that it believed Carter had committed. It was not enough for the court to say that Carter's actions were violent or forcible without pointing to a specific local, state or federal offense containing those same elements. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit found any error harmless because the sentencing court specified that a sentence of 37 months imprisonment was the appropriate sentence whether Carter committed a Grade A or B violation and listed a number of factors supporting that conclusion. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the sentence based on the district court's alternative sentence calculation and explanation.

Chief Judge McKee filed a concurring opinion, emphasizing that "[w]hen the basis of a supervised release violation is the commission of a new crime, the supervising court should not impose a sentence to punish the defendant for that new offense. Punishment is best left to the judge who is assigned to handle the new criminal case. The judge whose supervised release is violated should instead 'sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision,' ... and impose a sentence that will 'facilitate the integration of offenders back into the community.'"

Third Circuit abandons judicial use immunity for defense witnesses and finds that government's refusal to immunize co-defendant did not violate defendant's due process rights

In United States v. Quinn, No. 11-1733 (Aug. 14, 2013) (en banc), the Third Circuit joined every other federal Court of Appeals in rejecting the use of judicial grants of immunity for defense witnesses. Defendant Quinn was convicted after a jury trial for aiding and abetting co-defendant Shawn Johnson in an armed bank robbery. Quinn's defense was that he did not know Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint. Quinn believed Johnson would testify on his behalf at trial, but Johnson, who was awaiting sentencing on the robbery charges, invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. The district court refused to immunize Johnson and Quinn appealed.

On appeal, Quinn argued that the district court erred in refusing to immunize Johnson and that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by postponing Johnson's sentencing until after Quinn's trial in order to induce Johnson not to testify. The Third Circuit has recognized two situations where a criminal defendant may be entitled to have a defense witness receive immunity for his testimony: (1) when the government acts "with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding process," in which case the charges are dismissed unless the government chooses to immunize the witness at a new trial, United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), or (2) where the testimonial evidence is "clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and ... the government has no strong interest in withholding use immunity," in which case the district court was permitted to grant judicial use immunity to allow the testimony. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The Court noted that it was the only Court of Appeals to permit the trial court to immunize a defense witness and held that it was overturning the portion of Smith that permitted judicial grants of immunity. In so holding, the Court found that the decision to immunize a witness was a core prosecutorial function and that continuing to authorize judicial use immunity impinged on the separation of powers between the Executive and Judicial Branches. Although the Court abandoned the judicial use immunity remedy created in Smith, it retained Smith's five-part test for determining whether the government's refusal to immunize a defense witness denied a defendant due process.

Applying both Herman's "deliberate distortion" prosecutorial misconduct test and Smith's "clearly exculpatory and essential testimony" test to Quinn's appeal, the Court found that the government engaged in no wrongdoing. Under the "deliberate distortion" test, Quinn provided no evidence that Johnson intended to testify on his behalf, but was dissuaded from that testimony by the government's motion to continue sentencing. In fact, Johnson took no position on the delay of his sentencing and informed that trial court that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege if called to testify. Quinn fared no better under the Smith factors. While Smith (1) sought immunity in the district court and (2) Johnson was available to testify, he was unable to establish the remaining three factors, namely, that: (3) the proffered testimony was clearly exculpatory, (4) the testimony was essential, and (5) there was no strong governmental interests which countervailed against the grant of immunity. Here, Quinn offered no proof that Johnson would offer clearly exculpatory evidence. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that Quinn failed to show a due process violation requiring reversal and affirmed Quinn's conviction.

Thursday, September 05, 2013

Bad cop who is convicted of civil rights violation “distributed” drugs when he planted drugs on those he arrested and thus court did not err in applying the drug trafficking guideline.

United States v. Figueroa, No. 12-3575 (September 3, 2013). Defendant Figueroa was a Camden police officer who, along with other officers, planted drugs on and stole money from people he arrested. After trial, he was convicted of civil rights violations under 18 USC §§ 241 & 242 and he was sentenced to 10 years. Third Circuit affirmed both conviction and sentence.

District court did not err in using the drug trafficking guideline to calculate the range. USSG § 2H1.1 applies to civil rights violations. Under § 2H1.1(a), the base offense level is the highest of certain options including "the offense level from the offense guideline applicable to the underlying offense." Here, defendant’s actions of planting drugs on individuals fit the meaning of "distribute" under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) – transfer of a controlled substance from one person or place to another (statute carves out exception for cops lawfully engaged in law enforcement – but that exception doesn’t apply here). Because defendant committed the distribution of drugs in committing the civil rights violations, USSG § 2D1.1 applied. Also, the ten-year sentence, which was within the final guideline range, was substantively reasonable.

Third Circuit also affirmed a series of evidentiary rulings made by the district court: (1) Co-defendant’s out of court statement criticizing the way defendant wrote police reports was admissible as a co-conspirator statement in furtherance of conspiracy because co-defendant was commenting on defendant’s inability to write police reports in a way that would keep them safe from trouble. (2) Police reports offered by defendant were properly excluded as cumulative under FRE 403 because their proffered probative value, that they were false, had already been admitted by the witness. (3) Police officer’s testimony that the constitution required him to get consent forms signed prior to a search did not constitute improper expert testimony from a lay fact witness on an issue of constitutional law – there was no contemporaneous objection from defense and the officer was just testifying about police procedure.

District court’s jury instruction on the specific intent requirement of 18 USC § 242 was proper. Elements are: (1) defendant "acted under the color of law;" (2) deprived a person of civil rights; and (3) "acted knowingly, intentionally, and willfully." District court said that requisite intent is met if defendant intended to deprive someone of a legally recognized federal civil right OR acted "with reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite." District court did not act improperly in rejecting the defense’s requested instruction that the government proves "that the defendant’s aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution." District court’s instruction was a proper statement of the law.

Friday, August 16, 2013

As a matter of first impression, sentencing courts are not required to conduct two separate § 3553(a) analyses when imposing a new term of supervised release in addition to post-revocation imprisonment

United States v. Clark, No. 12-3462 (Aug. 13, 2013): During his term of supervised release, defendant Justin Clark was a passenger in vehicle pulled over out-of-state and found to be in possession of $20,000 in cash. Although no new criminal charges were brought as a result of this incident, Clark was charged with violating the terms of his supervised release for several traffic citations, failing to make payments on various fines and bank loan, and a positive drug test. Clark admitted to violating his supervised release and faced an advisory Guidelines range of 7 to 13 months. He argued for house arrest in lieu of incarceration. The district court sentenced him to 13 months imprisonment and a new 47 month term of supervised release. The sole basis for this sentence was Clark's overall conduct which, according to the court, demonstrated a general pattern of noncompliance with supervision.

On appeal, Clark argued that the district court should have been required to conduct two separate analyses under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) - one with respect to Clark's 13 month term of imprisonment and a second, separate analysis with respect to his 47 month term of supervised release. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that such an added layer of procedural formality would not further any substantive end because a full discussion of the § 3553(a) factors necessarily includes both the punitive purposes post-revocation incarceration as well as the rehabilitative purposes of supervised release. Here, however, the Third Circuit found the district court's procedure lacking. Specifically, while the record revealed a full discussion of the first § 3553(a) factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, the court merely enumerated the remaining § 3553(a) factors without discussion. This insufficient development of the record rendered the sentence imposed procedurally unreasonable and required a remand for resentencing.

Crime of knowingly presenting a materially false statement in an immigration form requires a statement made under oath

United States v. Ashurov, No. 12-2711 (Aug. 12, 2013): Defendant, a citizen of Tajikistan, entered the United States under a visitor's visa and subsequently sought to obtain an F-1 student visa that would permit him to enroll in an English language program and temporarily remain in the U.S.. As part of the F-1 student visa application process, Ashurov signed a student certification form (Form I-20) agreeing to comply with the terms and conditions of his admission as a student and certifying that he was seeking admission for the purpose of pursuing a full course of study. Ashurov completed the Form I-20 once a year for three consecutive years. The certification was not made under oath or penalty of perjury. An investigation of Ashurov's school eventually revealed that the school was not in compliance with federal regulations and, further, that Ashurov was not in compliance with the terms and conditions of his student visa, despite repeatedly certifying on his Form I-20 that he was in compliance.

Ashurov was convicted after trial of presenting a materially false statement in an immigration form, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), but the district court entered a judgment of acquittal concluding that the government failed to prove that Ashurov made any statements under oath. The United States appealed, asking that the conviction be reinstated because the "knowingly presents" clause of § 1546(a), which Ashurov was charged with violating, did not require that the materially false statement be made under oath.

After considering the plain language of the statute, various canons of statutory construction, the legislative history of the statute, the statute's purpose, and the single precedential case previously interpreting the statute, the Third Circuit concluded that there remained a grievous ambiguity as to the meaning of the "knowingly presents" clause of § 1546(a) and whether it required that the false statement be made under oath. Accordingly, applying the rule of lenity to the "needlessly  convoluted statute," the Court ruled in Ashurov's favor and upheld the judgment of acquittal.

Congratulations to Brett Sweitzer and the Philadelphia Federal Community Defender Office on the win!

Graphic videos of child pornography are admissible and relevant to show knowledge despite defendant's offer to stipulate videos constituted child pornography

United States v. Finley, No. 12-2524 (Aug. 12, 2013): Defendant Craig Finley appealed his conviction for production, receipt, distribution, and possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor and sentence of 50 years' imprisonment followed by lifetime supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed.

(1) Graphic videos and images were admissible and relevant to show knowledge despite defendant's offer to stipulate that videos constituted child pornography.

Before the jury was selected, defense counsel offered to stipulate that the videos and images obtained from the computers in the defendant's apartment were, in fact, child pornography, on the condition that the government not show the videos and images to the jury. The government refused the stipulation. After personally reviewing each proposed exhibit, the district court concluded that the videos and images were relevant and that the possible prejudice in introducing the evidence was outweighed by its probative value. The government, over defendant's objection, showed the jury 13 video segments and two segments of child pornography.

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's admission of the evidence. The Court agreed that the videos and images were probative of an essential element of the offense, namely, the defendant's knowledge that the videos and images contained child pornography. The Court also found that the district court properly exercised its discretion in admitting a small sampling of the videos and images obtained only after personally reviewing the admitted evidence, weighing any unfair prejudice against the probative value of the images, and cautioning potential jurors about the disturbing nature of the potential evidence as part of the jury selection process.

(2) District court did not err by instructing jury that a sleeping child can "engage in" sexually explicit conduct within the context of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).

With respect to his conviction for producing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, the defendant argued that the district court erred in instructing jurors that a sleeping child can "engage in" sexually explicit conduct. He asserted that § 2251(a) requires the minor, as opposed to the perpetrator, to actively engage in sexually explicit conduct. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the plain language of the statute, public policy, and persuasive case law all compel the conclusion that active involvement on the part of a minor is not essential for a conviction under § 2251(a).

(3) Punishment for both receipt and distribution of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor did not violate Double Jeopardy.

Finally, the defendant argued that the district court violated his double jeopardy rights by separately considering, for purposes of sentencing, his convictions for receiving and distributing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). While the Third Circuit agreed that the defendant's convictions were the same in law, because § 2252(a)(2) did not contain multiple subsections or separate clauses indicating separate crimes for receipt and distribution, the convictions were not the same in fact. The Court found that the defendant distributed certain images that he produced separate and apart from images he received, he received images that he did not possess, and he distributed different images that he already possessed, thus making multiple punishments permissible.

Monday, August 12, 2013

En Banc Court Disavows Heightened Standard of Review in Challenges to Sufficiency of Evidence in Drug Conspiracy Prosecutions

United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, No. 11-3768.  Sitting en banc, a unanimous Court revisits “a long line of cases” addressing the government’s burden in drug trafficking prosecutions to show that a defendant (commonly, a courier) knew the object of a conspiracy was the distribution of a controlled substance, not just some type of contraband. Reading one line of precedent to have applied an improperly heightened standard, the Court clarifies that review for the sufficiency of evidence is the same in this context as in others.

Under the Jackson v. Virginia test, the Court reiterates in an opinion by Judge Rendell, “the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction … is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” When applying this standard, the Court does not have the privilege of casting the “decisive vote on the jury,” but must affirm so long as “the jury’s verdict did not fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”

In drug conspiracy prosecutions, “the prosecution must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy’s specific objective” — that is, must prove the defendant knew he or his co-conspirators were moving drugs. The Court clarifies, however, “that knowledge need not be proven by direct evidence.” So long as “a jury could rationally conclude that the defendant knew the subject of the conspiracy was drugs,” it is not fatal to the conviction that “the evidence was as consistent with contraband other than controlled substances.”

The Court concludes by finding in the case before it that the jury could reasonably have concluded both that the defendant knew he was involved in an illegal venture and that he “knew — or was willfully blind to the fact — that the illegal venture involved transporting drugs.” The Court emphasized the large amount of money the jury could infer the defendant had been offered to retrieve two suitcases from a luggage carousel, evidence that he had been left alone with this luggage for a time, and the heavy weight of the suitcases, which, the Court explained, jurors might decide as a matter of “common sense” would have led the defendant to know that they held drugs rather than cash, or at least to have been aware of the high probability they did.

In the course of clarifying its case law, the Court offers a sustained discussion of nine prior decisions in which it evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence in drug conspiracy prosecutions. Given the issue taken up by the en banc Court, the discussion focuses on these previous decisions’ variability in addressing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. But what may be of equal interest for those presently defending a drug conspiracy prosecution is the thorough discussion of the wide range of facts that can distinguish one drug conspiracy prosecution from another. While the very point of Caraballo-Rodriguez is that each case is different and there is no “specific formula as to what conduct or evidence is sufficient to infer knowledge,” the opinion’s overview of a range of conspiracy prosecutions may help reveal what is missing in any given case — including ones approaching trial now. Reviewing how the government has proved knowledge before might just turn up weak points in cases that still remain for a jury to decide.

Friday, August 09, 2013

Second Rule 404(b) Ruling of the Week: Convictions for Simple Possession of Cocaine Were Not Admissible to Prove Knowledge or Intent to Distribute in a PWID Case

The Third Circuit issued another strongly worded precedential Rule 404(b) opinion today, explaining that the strictures of the rule are often "honored in the breach" by district courts.

In United States v. Terrell Davis, No. 12-1486, the Third Circuit held that the government's barebones evidence that the defendant had twice been convicted of simple possession of cocaine was not admissible at his trial for possession with intent to distribute a kilo of cocaine. The cocaine was in the back seat of the car Davis was riding in. In its motion to admit the simple possession convictions, the government argued a litany of enumerated Rule 404(b) purposes.  On appeal, the government argued the evidence was admissible to prove knowledge that the drugs were in the back of the vehicle and/or Davis's intent to distribute the drugs. The government did not offer any any evidence to prove that the cocaine from Davis's past simple possession convictions was similar in appearance, quantity, or form to what was found in the vehicle on this occasion.

This second Rule 404(b) opinion of the week really sheds light on the second Huddleston prong - relevancy. The Court dug into the simple possession convictions, noting that simply because Davis possessed drugs before in some unknown quantity or form (i.e. powder, or crack, etc.) did not mean that he knew what the compressed powder cocaine was in this case. Similarly, with respect to intent, Davis' prior simple possession of drugs was hardly relevant to his intent to distribute, since far more people use drugs than sell them.

The Third Circuit also highlighted the district court's error at the fourth and final Huddleston prong - the cautionary instruction. Here, the district court did not caution the jurors regarding the limited purpose for the evidence at the time the evidence was presented. It only instructed the jury during the final jury charge.  Furthermore, rather than specifying the limited purpose for which the court admitted the evidence, knowledge, the district court read off the litany of enumerated Rule 404(b) purposes in its instruction.

This opinion highlights the importance of challenging every step of the Huddleston test in defense responses to the government's motions to admit Rule 404(b) evidence.

The opinion is located here:   
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/121486p.pdf

Thursday, August 08, 2013

How to Oppose the Government's Rule 404(b) Motion

United States v. Smith, No. 12-1516. Too often, it can seem that Rule 404(b) is applied in a manner that glosses over the government’s obligation to articulate how proffered evidence serves a proper purpose and why it warrants admission despite being prejudicial. In Smith, the Third Circuit offers a reminder that the strictures limiting admissibility under 404(b) are real.

Durrell Smith was charged with assaulting federal officers, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. He admitted that he had been in possession of a gun at the time of his arrest, but told police he had retrieved it moments before in self defense, fearing attack from whoever was in a car with tinted windows that had just pulled up across the street. In fact, the car was an unmarked police vehicle in which agents were conducting surveillance in an ongoing drug investigation.

At trial, the government sought to introduce evidence that two years earlier, Smith had been observed selling drugs on the same street corner. The government’s theory of admissibility was that this showed motive. Smith, the prosecutor argued, "has a history of selling heroin on this corner," tending to show that he would be inclined to assault officers to protect his "turf." The district court admitted the evidence and Smith was convicted.

In a unanimous opinion by Judge Fuentes, the Court held the evidence’s admission improper under Rule 404(b). The Court agreed that motive was relevant, and even that Smith had placed motive in controversy by claiming self defense. But this alone was not enough. Under Rule 404(b), "the proponent must set forth a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed offenses before, he therefore is more likely to have committed this one." The Court explained that the government’s motive theory embodied such a propensity inference because it required the jury to infer motive by reasoning that, since Smith was selling drugs two years earlier, he must have been doing so again -- and thus have "turf" to protect.

Moreover, the Court faulted the district court for the Rule 403 balancing it was required to conduct as one part of the Rule 404(b) analysis. The district court had stated that the earlier conduct was "significantly prejudicial" but, "given the issues in this case," not "unfairly prejudicial." This "recitation" was not sufficient because it did not address the "diminished probative value" of the prior bad act in light of its dissimilarity from the charged conduct: "one involved drugs and no gun and the other a gun and no drugs."

Smith illustrates the importance of making the government articulate the chain of inferences it wishes to have the jury draw. The government may not simply invoke "motive" or "knowledge" as a mantra. And the defense needs to insist on scrutiny of the proposed chain so that any forbidden propensity "link" is revealed, as well as to ensure that whatever force the government's inferences do carry is not exaggerated relative to prejudicial effect.

Congratulations to Kevin Carlucci and his colleagues in the Defender’s office in Newark.

Tuesday, August 06, 2013

Some Reprieve in Supervised Release: New Limit on Authority to "Stack" Prison Terms for Violation … Plus New Approval of Crack Variance

United States v. Dillon, No. 12-2653.  Held:  (1) District court plainly errs when, for supervised release violation, court imposes consecutive terms of imprisonment on each of several counts if original sentence included only “a term” of supervised release; (2) In fashioning sentence for supervised release violation on part of defendant whose sentence was based on old “100-to-1” crack guideline, and who never got full benefit of Sentencing Commission’s amendments reducing disparate treatment of crack and powder offenses, district court should take account of defendant’s prior service of excessive prison term.

In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress created supervised release for the purpose of assisting defendants’ reentry following lengthy periods of imprisonment.  The courts of appeals, however, have commonly held the supervised release regime to provide for extremely harsh punishment.  This development owes in no small part to the rule that, when supervised release is revoked, the sentencing judge may impose a consecutive term of imprisonment for each concurrent term of supervised release included in the original sentence.  See United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 867 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under that rule, a defendant can be sentenced, for example, to up to seven years in prison for violating supervised release if he was originally convicted of a street-level drug offense with a gun.  This week, in Dillon, the Circuit identifies a limitation that reins in, to some degree, runaway revocation sentencing under this “stacking” rule.

In a unanimous decision authored by Judge Fisher, the Court holds that when the original sentence refers simply to “a term” of supervised release, only one term of post-revocation imprisonment may be imposed.  The limitation applies regardless of whether the judge who imposed the original sentence actually intended to impose multiple concurrent terms, and even where the judge was required to do so as a matter of law.

Percy Dillon (of United States v. Dillon fame, see 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010)) was convicted on two counts of trafficking in cocaine (both crack and powder) and one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.  Under the mandatory Guidelines, he was sentenced in 1993 to 322 months’ imprisonment.  By law, the district court was required to impose concurrent terms of supervised release on each of the drug counts.  Presumably out of inadvertence, the court instead pronounced a sentence whereby “the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of five years.”

In 2011, following his release, Mr. Dillon was arrested and charged with violating the condition prohibiting him from associating with convicted felons or criminals, because he accepted a ride home from his cousin (his original codefendant) after smelling marijuana in the car.  The court found Mr. Dillon in violation, revoked supervised release, and imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment on each of the original counts.  On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that where “a district court’s sentence includes ‘a term’ of supervised release, the court may not sentence the defendant to multiple terms of reimprisonment and/or supervised release upon a subsequent revocation of supervised release.”

The Court rejected the government’s arguments that the district court, “despite what it said … actually meant to sentence Dillon to three concurrent terms of supervised release” and, moreover, was “obligated by law” to impose concurrent terms on two of the counts.  Such intentions and legal infirmity aside, “[a] defendant cannot be reimprisoned for violating the conditions of non-existent terms of supervised release.… In 1993, when the District Court sentenced Dillon to ‘a term’ of supervised release, it capped the number of supervised release terms it could revoke at any future proceeding at one.”

Dillon has important implications for the representation of defendants in revocation proceedings.  In determining the maximum authorized length of post-revocation imprisonment, it should not be presumed that the court may stack consecutive terms just because the defendant was originally convicted of multiple counts.  Rather, it is essential to review the original sentence to see whether separate, concurrent terms were specifically imposed on different counts by express pronouncement of the court.  If not, then the defendant may not be sentenced to imprisonment any greater in length than the maximums provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); the supervising court may not exceed these limits by stacking consecutive terms that add up to more than the statutory maximum.  The Circuit implies that if there exists any exception to this rule, it is only where the judgment’s reference to “a term” reflects a clerical error, i.e., where the judge orally pronounced multiple concurrent terms, but the written judgment does not accurately reflect the sentence pronounced.

In vacating Percy Dillon’s sentence, the Third Circuit further ordered the district court to consider on remand that Dillon had served 28 more months in prison than the present crack guideline would direct.  This inequity was unusually palpable in Mr. Dillon’s case because he had actually been released upon the court’s granting of his Section 3582 motion to reduce sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Commission’s retroactive amendment to the crack guideline, which shrunk his Guidelines range to a period less than the time he had already served.  Putting aside this particularly egregious fact pattern, the same unfairness should be recognized whenever the defendant’s prison term concluded before sentence could be reduced pursuant to the Commission’s repeat amendments (circa 2007 and 2011) reducing the disparity embodied in the crack guideline.  Thus, at least where the defendant would have been eligible for a Section 3582 reduction, a supervising court in a crack case should always consider making dispensation for the fact that the defendant previously served what, it is now clear, was an excessive prison term.  For the Third Circuit’s most recent guidance concerning eligibility for Section 3582 reductions, see United States v. Flemming, —F.3d— , 2013 WL 3779977 (3d Cir. July 22, 2013) (career offenders), and United States v. Savani, —F.3d—, 2013 WL 2462941 (3d Cir. June 10, 2013) (substantial assistance departures).

Congratulations to Renee Pietropaolo and her colleagues at the Defender’s office in the Western District of Pennsylvania on a great win.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Career Offenders Convicted of Crack Offenses Are Not Eligible for a Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) if the District Court Granted a Downward Departure Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 at Sentencing

In United States v. Flemming, No. 12-1118, the Third Circuit held that crack defendants who were designated as career offenders, but were granted downward departures from their career offender status pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, are not entitled to a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

Flemming’s crack guideline range was 92 to 115 months imprisonment under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Due to his designation as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), however, his resultant guideline range became 262 to 327 months. The district court found that the career offender guideline overstated Flemming’s criminal history and granted a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, finding that the crack guideline range of 92 to 115 months was more appropriate. The court ultimately sentenced Flemming to 175 months - 115 months for the crack offense, and a consecutive 60 month sentence for his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction. The district court reduced Flemming’s sentence under Amendment 706 to the guidelines, issued in 2007, which lowered the guideline ranges for crack offenses. See United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2010). Flemming was re-sentenced to 137 months - 77 months for the crack offense, and a consecutive 60 month term for the 924(c) conviction. He then moved for a second sentence reduction under Amendment 750 to the Guidelines, which further decreased the guidelines for crack offenses in response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The district court denied his motion.

The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), precluding sentence reductions if a defendant’s "applicable guideline range" is not reduced by the amendment, prevented reductions in cases like these. During Flemming’s first appeal, the Third Circuit held that the Guidelines’ definition of "applicable guideline range" was ambiguous, and thus the rule of lenity allowed him to move for his first sentence reduction. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 270. Amendment 759 to the Guidelines, however, added a new definition of "applicable guideline range" in 2010. It is now defined as "the guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance."

The Third Circuit reasoned that since the definition states that the applicable guideline range is "determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance," it is clear that a § 4A1.3 departure is ignored for purposes of determining a defendant’s applicable guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. N. 1(A). Any § 4A1.3 departure is to be calculated after the applicable guideline range is calculated. The Court explained that its reading is supported by the Commission’s stated reason for adding a new definition of "applicable guideline range." The Commission meant to adopt the approach of those Circuit Courts of Appeal that have held that career offenders granted § 4A1.3 departures are not eligible for resentencing. U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 759. Thus, Flemming was not entitled to a second sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Issuance of United States Passport Is Not Conclusive Proof Of Citizenship/ No Brady Violation Where Defense Declines Continuance/ No Judicial Estoppel Where Inconsistencies Explained


United States v. Moreno , No. 12-1460 (3d Cir. 7/3/13) concerned a conviction for  false representation of United States citizenship. Ms. Moreno, born in Mexico in 1971, was adopted by  U.S. citizen nine years later. In 1981, New Mexico issued a birth certificate stating that her place of birth was Mexico.  Her conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and false imprisonment, led to deportation proceedings, and after the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Board of Immigration Appeals determination that she was not a citizen, she was deported, in 2006, to Mexico.

In 2007, without permission, she returned to the United States and applied for a passport, listing New Mexico as her place of birth. The passport was issued, but seized by the Border Patrol in Texas. The passport was never revoked though. She was detained by ICE, but released pending further investigation.  In 2011, after she asked, DHS told her she was not a citizen.  Later that year, she traveled to the United States Virgin Islands and in response to a question about her citizenship, she gave an immigration officer her New Mexico driver’s license.  She also stated, in response to questions, that she was a U.S. citizen, gave them a certificate of live birth from New Mexico, and a copy of her U.S, passport.  Following inquiries to DHS, Ms. Moreno was arrested for falsely representing herself to be a U.S. citizen in violation of 18 U.S.C. §911. Following a jury trial, she was convicted.

On appeal, Ms. Moreno raised five issues. The first was that the District Court erred in denying her motion for acquittal because the issuance of a passport constituted conclusive proof of citizenship. 22 U.S.C. §2705   provides that a passport is proof of citizenship. However, §2705 provides that the passport is proof of citizenship only if it is issued to a citizen of the United States. Ms. Moreno was never a citizen, so the passport was not proof of citizenship. (A passport can be issued not only to a United States citizen, but to a United States “national,” which includes persons, though not citizens, owe permanent allegiance to the United States. 8 U.S.C. §1101(22) Ms. Moreno did not argue she was a United States national.). The Court noted that some other courts have held that a passport is conclusive proof of citizenship, but it expressly declined to adopt that interpretation.

The next issue Ms Moreno raised was whether the District Court erred by not instructing the jury that the issuance of the passport was conclusive proof of United States citizenship. Given its first ruling, the Court decided that failure to give that instruction was not error.

Ms. Moreno next argued that the government’s disclosure, the day before trial , of documents showing a DHS investigation concluding the passport was valid but calling for further investigation into her citizenship and that deportation should be stayed until her passport was revoked. She claimed this was a Brady violation, but she forewent an offer of a continuance, and an opportunity to cross-examine a government witness about the documents. Because she had sufficient opportunity to use the documents she did not suffer prejudice from the untimely disclosure.

Ms. Moreno’s argument that the District Court unfairly prevented her from introducing and FOIA documents and an FBI report listing her citizenship as “United States.” Because the jury had already heard evidence about government decisions listing her as  United States citizen, the documents were cumulative and would have caused juror confusion. The Court also rejected her argument that the government was judicially estopped from denying that she was a citizen because the passport had not been revoked. Passports issued in error are not automatically revoked, so the government had not asserted inconsistent positions.

Judge Smith dissented, posting that under  22 U.S.C. §2705, the passport should have been treated as conclusive proof of citizenship.


Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Court Finds Longest Insider-Trading Sentence Ever Imposed Reasonable (and rejects other sentencing challenges)

In United States v. Kluger, No. 12-2701 (July 9, 2013), the Court addressed numerous challenges to Kluger’s mid-range, 144-month sentence, "a term thought to be the longest insider trading sentence ever imposed." Kluger, a law student, and then lawyer for five different securities law firms over the course of his career, was the source of tips for a three-man insider-trading scheme that spanned seventeen-years, "and, so far as is known, constituted the longest such scheme in United States history." The Court rejected Kluger’s complaints about the calculation of his Guidelines range, purported procedural errors in his sentencing, and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his lengthy term of imprisonment.

Guidelines calculation: Under § 2B1.4, the district court attributed all of the scheme’s monetary gain (nearly $50 million) to Kluger, even though his share of the profits was far less than that of one of his co-defendants. Kluger and both of his co-defendants had agreed to limit their trades in an effort to avoid detection, but one co-defendant had violated the agreement. Kluger therefore argued that, under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s reasonable foreseeability test, the district court should have reduced the gains attributable to him. Applying United States v. Cespedes, 663 F.3d 685, 689 (3d Cir. 2011), the Court held that the "unless otherwise specified" exception in § 1B1.3(a) required it to look first to the insider trading guideline. There, it found that "[t]he plain language of the commentary’s background unequivocally attributes all of [the co-defendant’s] gains to Kluger because [the co-defendant] was ‘a person[] acting in concert with the defendant,’ as well as one ‘to whom the defendant provided inside information.’" The Court emphasized that this result "reinforc[es] the deterrence message sent to would-be tippers."

Procedural errors: (1) Evidentiary Hearing. The district court did not err in refusing to grant Kluger an evidentiary hearing, since the Rules do not require an evidentiary hearing, and the district court did afford an "extensive sentencing hearing . . . in which the parties addressed the Court." Kluger had not disputed the total gain or that he was the source of the tips, so an evidentiary hearing would not have altered the outcome at sentencing. (2) PSR Objections. Kluger complained that the PSR did not resolve all of his objections, including to the characterization of the scheme and the description of him as the initiator of it. The Court noted that, under Rule 32(g), Probation is not required to do so. Rather, under Rule 32(i), the district court must make a disposition on matters that will affect sentencing, which it did when it made its ruling under §2B1.4. (3) Discovery. Kluger claimed that his due process rights were violated when the government provided materials to Probation that were not provided to him. The Court held that Rule 32 does not provide for broad discovery of presentence materials, and that even if it did, Kluger had done no more than speculate as to the existence of such materials.

Reasonableness of Sentence: (1) Procedural Reasonableness. Kluger argued that the district court only mechanically considered the § 3553(a) factors and failed to consider the "vast disparity" between his sentence, his co-defendants’ sentences, and the sentences of other insider traders. The Court found that the district court engaged in a thorough discussion of the circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, "such as Kluger’s loving and supportive family, privileged childhood, and the ability of the Bureau of Prisons to manage his poor health during his incarceration." It rejected the disparity argument, as well, citing the facts that Kluger was an attorney, the source of the tips, and that he spent most of his career involved in criminal activity ("he truly was a career criminal"). Unlike one co-defendant, Kluger did not cooperate. Unlike the other, Kluger did not have a history of community service. Compared to other cases, this one was longer, more involved, and more successful. (2) Substantive reasonableness. Noting that Kluger received a within-Guidelines sentence, which is less likely to be unreasonable than one outside the range, the Court concluded, "we cannot say that ‘no reasonable sentencing court’ would have imposed the same sentence . . . ."

Tuesday, July 02, 2013

Under The Speedy Trial Act, The Trial Clock Remains Tolled In The Time Period Between a Competency Evaluation and a Court's Final Determination of Competency.



    In a matter of first impression, the Third Circuit held that the time statutorily excludable under the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(A)) for a competency evaluation extends past the actual examination and continues until the court has made a final determination concerning a defendant’s competency.  U.S. v. Graves, No. 12-2688,  (3d Cir. June 21, 2013)

    Appellant Lee Graves was arraigned on March 2, 2011 on one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §841and §846.  At the arraignment hearing, held on March 31, 2011, a magistrate judge ordered a competency evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §4241(b).   Although the trial had been scheduled to start on June 3, 2011, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) did not complete an evaluation report until June 22, 2011.  The report was mailed on June 28, 2011 and received, at the earliest, by the court on July 7, 2011.  A status hearing was held on September 21, 2011, during which the District Court found Graves competent to stand trial.  At that same hearing, newly-appointed defense counsel moved for a continuance to prepare for trial.      

    A few weeks after that hearing, Graves claimed a Speedy Trial violation.  He argued that more than 70 inexcuable days had passed since his indictment without a trial.  Specifically,  Graves argued that the excludable delay for the competency review ended when the report was sent to the court, while the Government argued that the clock remained tolled until the official ruling on his competency, which did not occur until the status hearing several months later.  The District Court found no violation. 
   
    The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the language in the Act, relevant to delays for mental competency, contemplated excusing the entire evaluation proceedings, not just the actual examination.  The circuit court explained that the examination and resulting report constituted just one step in the process.  A trial court must still review the report and relevant evidence to determine if a defendant is fit to stand trial.  Also, in reaching this decision, the appellate court noted that the Act does not place a limit on the length of delays for a competency proceeding.  Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the clock remains tolled even after an evaluation report is submitted to the court, until a formal ruling on competency is entered by that court.
   
     Accordingly, the excluded delay included the time period from the day the evaluation was ordered (March 31) until the day the court entered the order finding Graves competent to stand trial (September 21).  Additionally, the Third Circuit also found that a new period of excusable delay began when the defense requested a continuance at the same September status hearing.  Thus, in this case, the only days that counted against the Speedy Trial clock was the period between the March 2 indictment and the March 31 order for a competency evaluation, totaling 28 days.  Therefore, there was no violation of Graves’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act.

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Tax Protester’s Conviction for Conspiracy to Defraud the United States Affirmed


In United States v. Donald Turner (a/k/a Don L.Wood), No. 12-1420, (May 1, 2013), the Third Circuit affirmed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, in addition to affirming the order for restitution in the amount of $408,043 to the Government. 

Turner was convinced by a jury under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and was ordered to pay restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 in addition to his sentencing.  Turner is the author of Tax Free! How the Super Rich Do It!, an instruction manual for “escaping federal and state income taxation” by using common law trust organizations (“colatos”).  Turner was also the former director of First American Research (FAR), a membership organization that was designed to assist members in executing the colato program outlined in Tax Free!.  In 1991 FAR created “Center Company,” a foreign colato, and FAR member Daniel Leveto “sold” his veterinary clinic to Center Company.  Center Company then hired Leveto as general manager to the clinic and Turner as a consultant. Leveto continued to operate his veterinary clinic as he did when he was owner, but paid no taxes on the clinic and had full access to its finances.

In 1993, Turner and Leveto contracted an agreement for Leveto to market and sell copies of Tax Free!.  Two years later, the IRS began a criminal investigation to determine if the “sale” of the veterinary clinic to Center Company and the colato program were valid. Under this investigation, Manuel Gonzalez, an IRS agent, purchased a copy of Tax Free! from Leveto and spoke both in person and over the phone with him.  Leveto later submitted Gonzalez’s name to Turner for membership into FAR, and Turner sent Gonzalez a letter explaining the benefits of joining the organization and spoke with Turner on the phone.  The recordings obtained by Gonzalez during these interactions and documents later seized from Leveto’s residence were the points of contest in this appeal.

Turner appeals the District Court’s decision alleging the Court erred in admitting (1) recorded conversations between his co-conspirator and an undercover Internal Revenue Service agent and (2) foreign bank documents that the IRS took possession of from his co-conspirator’s residence and office.  In addition, Turner argues that the Court also erred in requiring him to pay $408,043 without first investigating his ability to pay that sum.

The Court of Appeals found that the District Court committed no error in allowing the recordings of conversations between Leveto and Gonzalez because a conspiracy clearly existed between Turner and Leveto, making the recordings admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).  Second, the Court found that the District Court clearly met its slight burden of proving the authenticity and exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness because Turner has, in no way, identified that the documents, which appear official and contain personal account information, are forged or inaccurate. These documents were also found in Leveto’s personal office and safe in his house, adding to their credibility. Accordingly, the foreign bank statements can be permitted under the residual hearsay exception. Lastly, with regard to the restitution ordered by the District Court, the Court of Appeals found it appropriate to apply the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which requires that the full amount of restitution be paid without consideration of the defendant’s economic circumstances.
 
Prepared by Law Clerk Brittany Quinn

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

Defendants Convicted of Crack Offenses Who Received Cooperation Departures Below the Mando are not Barred From Seeking a Sentence Reduction Under Section 3582(c)(2)

In United States v. Savani, Nos. 11-4359/11-4494/12-1034, the Third Circuit held that Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines superseded United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009), and allows defendants who were sentenced below their mandatory minimum sentences for substantial assistance to move for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The three appellants in Savani were in similar positions. All three were facing mandatory minimum sentences for crack offenses - Savani and Herbert were facing 10 years, and Roe was facing twenty years, due to his prior conviction. All three defendants entered into cooperation plea agreements with the government, and they all received sentences below the mandatory minimums.

After the Fair Sentencing Act ("FSA") was passed in August 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 by reducing the guidelines to correspond to the18:1 ratio that now triggers mandatory minimum sentences under the FSA. All three defendants filed motions to reduce their sentences under § 3582(c)(2). All three motions were denied by the district courts, citing Doe.

Doe held that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement § 1B1.10(b)(2)(b), precluding sentence reductions if a defendant’s "applicable guideline range" is not reduced by the amendment, prevented reductions in cases like these. "Applicable guideline range" was not then defined, but the Doe Court ruled that it must mean the starting point for calculation of the sentence - in these cases, the mandatory minimum, not the crack guideline range. Thus, the defendants were ineligible under § 3582(c)(2), because even if their departures were somehow "based on" the now-lower crack guideline range, granting relief would be inconsistent with the Commission’s policy statement.

In 2011, however, when the Commission issued the most recent retroactive crack amendment, it also offered a definition of the term "applicable guideline range." According to Application Note 1(A) to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the"applicable guideline range" is "the guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category determined pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A).

In a 2-1 decision, the Court determined that this language supersedes Doe, and that the defendants were eligible for relief. The majority reached this decision on rule of lenity grounds. It first examined multiple Guidelines provisions, seeking to clarify the definition and the Commission’s intent, but it concluded that it was unclear whether - in the context of cooperators receiving substantial assistance departures - the definition referred to the guideline range or the mandatory minimum guideline sentence.

Judge Fuentes filed a separate opinion concurring in the result, but expressing the opinion that the plain language of the emergency amendments rendered the appellants eligible for sentence reductions. His opinion relied primarily on an analysis of the language of the definition as compared with the eight-step sentencing process.

The government is considering whether to seek rehearing or to petition for certiorari.  However, in the meantime, the government may not oppose bail for defendants who might otherwise be eligible for immediate release under the amendment.

Congratulations to Sarah Gannett for an amazing job, and special thanks for her help on this post!

Third Circuit Finds Defendant Was Not Seized Where He Briefly Paused and Raised Hands Before Fleeing

In United States v. Amos , ---F. 4th---, 2023 WL 8636910 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2023), the Third Circuit affirmed a district court's denial o...