At
trial, defense counsel impeached a government cooperator as coloring his
testimony in exchange for sentencing concessions. The prosecutor rehabilitated the cooperator
by having him read into the record portions of memoranda written by a federal
agent, documenting the cooperator’s proffer sessions. The Third Circuit held this to be a
Confrontation Clause violation, as the memoranda were statements of the agent
rather than the cooperator, even though the memoranda purported to document the
cooperator’s statements. The Circuit
found the error harmless, however, under the specific circumstances of this
case.
The
Third Circuit also concluded that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to
support the application of the four-level sentencing enhancement for more than
50 victims under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). Specifically, the court determined
that the evidence supported a finding that Defendant had provided more than 110
fraudulent appraisals during the course of the mortgage fraud conspiracy, and
that unsophisticated buyers either purchased the fraudulent appraisals or were
induced to purchase properties at prices that were well above their true value.
Defendant
also claimed that his right to allocution had been violated when the sentencing
court permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine him during his allocution.
Citing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, as interpreted by United
States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct.
2684 (2014), the Third Circuit determined allowing cross-examination of
allocution is plain error because it is contrary to the purpose of allocution,
i.e., to allow a defendant to personally address the sentencing court and
present mitigating evidence. The court concluded that Defendant did not attempt
to testify or challenge the facts of the case, which may have warranted cross
examination. To the contrary, Defendant merely presented information about
himself and his acceptance of responsibility. Consequently, the sentencing
court committed plain error in allowing to prosecutor to conduct the
cross-examination during allocution in contradiction of clear authority, namely
Rule 32 and Ward. Allocution error is presumed prejudicial on
plain-error review, but the Court noted that there was evidence of actual
prejudice here. Both the prosecutor and the sentencing court relied upon
Defendant’s responses to the cross-examination during allocution in
recommending and fashioning his sentence.
The
Third Circuit also noted that even if the sentencing court had not committed
plain error, the Court would have invoked its supervisory authority to prohibit
cross-examination during allocution.